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INTRODUCTION 
Appellant Penny Mackey ("Mackey") appeals from a judgment 
setting aside a quitclaim deed executed by her grandmother Louise 
Baugh ("Baugh") giving Mackey a one-half interest in two 
properties located in Clearfield, Utah. Appellant argues that 
the deed was a present conveyance of a property interest that was 
not testamentary in character, and therefore the quitclaim deed 
should not have been set aside by the trial court. 
Jurisdiction 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 
UTAH CODE UNANN. § 78-2A-3(k) (1993). 
Standard of Review 
Factual findings of the trial court are set aside only if 
they are clearly erroneous. Anderson v. Brinkerhoff. 756 P.2d 
95, 98 (Utah Ct. App. 1988)(affirming invalidity of deeds). 
However findings of fact relating to intent "must show that the 
court's judgment or decree 'follows logically from, and is 
supported by the evidence.'" Estate of Ashton v. Ashton, 804 
P.2d 540, 542 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)(trial court's findings 
insufficient to support judgment regarding testator's 
intent)(citations omitted). Moreover, "one who asserts the 
invalidity of a deed must so prove by clear and convincing 
evidence." Controlled Receivables, Inc. v. Harman, 413 P.2d 807, 
809 (Utah 1966) (affirming validity of deed); See also. Baker v. 
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Pattee, 684 P.2d 632, 634 (Utah 1984) (affirming validity of 
deed). This Court gives no deference to the trial court's 
conclusions of law. Davidson Lumber Sales, Inc. v. Bonneville 
Inv., Inc., 794 P.2d 11 (Utah 1990). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Did the trial court err when it ruled that a quitclaim 
deed, duly executed and recorded, did not presently convey the 
grantor's entire interest in the properties to the grantee? 
2. Alternatively, did the trial court err when it failed to 
consider the possibility that a quitclaim deed, duly executed and 
recorded, presently conveyed a vested remainder interest to the 
grantee, despite retention of a life estate for the grantor? 
RELEVANT STATUTORY PROVISION 
There is a relevant statutory provision on this appeal. 
UTAH CODE UNANN. § 5 7 - 1 - 3 (1993) s t a t e s : 
A fee simple title is presumed to be intended to pass 
by a conveyance of real estate, unless it appears from 
the conveyance that a lesser estate was intended. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
The Appellees, Ernest Gleed ("Gleed") and Baugh, through her 
substituted party plaintiff and personal representative Verlin 
Gleed, sued the Appellant Mackey to set aside a quitclaim deed 
dated March 23, 1992. The deed was executed by Baugh several 
2 
months before her death. Its effect would have been to sever a 
joint tenancy Baugh created by deed to Gleed in 1990 in two 
adjacent homes in Clearfield, Utah, making Mackey and Gleed 
tenants in common. Gleed—who is one of Baugh's sons—asserted 
that Mackey—who is Baugh's granddaughter by a daughter— 
exercised undue influence over Baugh, and that Baugh was not 
competent when she executed the quitclaim deed. 
Course of the Proceedings Below 
This action was tried before the trial court without a jury 
on August 19 and 20, 1993. A number of doctors and persons 
familiar with Baugh testified as to her competence to execute the 
deed, whether Mackey exercised undue influence over Baugh, and 
what Baugh's intentions were when executing the deed. The trial 
court announced its ruling from the bench before the parties and 
counsel on August 25, 1993. Both the Appellant and Appellee 
submitted proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law and 
judgement on two occasions following the ruling, and additionally 
the parties' counsel made arguments at a telephone conference 
hearing the trial court convened on January 14, 1994. Based on 
the trial record, the arguments and objections made by the 
respective counsel at the January 14, 1994 hearing, and from the 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law entered by the court, the 
trial court issued its judgment on January 25, 1994. 
Disposition Below 
The trial court ruled that the March 23, 1992 quitclaim deed 
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from Baugh to Mackey was invalid and should be set aside. While 
the trial court found that Baugh was competent when she executed 
the quitclaim deed and not under undue influence from Mackey, the 
court found that Baugh did not intend to transfer a present 
ownership interest in the properties, but rather intended the 
quitclaim deed to have testamentary effect. Additionally, the 
trial court ruled that the 1990 warranty deed making Gleed and 
Baugh joint tenants in the properties was valid and binding as to 
the home Gleed occupied, but was invalid as to the home Baugh 
lived in because there had been no intent by Baugh to convey a 
present ownership interest in her house. Gleed cross-appeals to 
this court for relief regarding that aspect of the trial court's 
decision. 
Statement of the Facts 
In the late 1950's and early 1960's, Baugh and her husband 
acquired two adjacent lots with houses (the "properties") in 
Clearfield, Utah as joint tenants. The Baughs lived continuously 
in one of these houses and rented out the other property. 
Baugh's husband died in 1990. Shortly thereafter the 
Appellee Gleed moved back to Utah from Nevada. Gleed occupied 
the rental property while Baugh continued to occupy her house. 
On February 14, 1990, Baugh executed and recorded a warranty deed 
conveying in joint tenancy to herself and Gleed the two 
properties. 
Mackey lived for extended periods of time with her 
grandparents, the Baughs, during her childhood and early 
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adulthood until 1982. She was the Baughs favorite granddaughter. 
Mackey continued to live nearby in Utah until 1985, when at age 
twenty-six she moved out-of-state due to her husband's career 
opportunities. Mackey returned to Utah in November 1990 to be 
near her grandmother, Baugh. Following her return, Mackey 
continued her close relationship with her grandmother. Their 
closeness was indicated by the fact Mackey bathed Baugh (who 
suffered from chronic lung disease) once or twice a week, visited 
Baugh as often as possible (often on a daily basis), and provided 
Baugh with affection and companionship. 
Baugh died intestate on July 29, 1992 at seventy-eight years 
of age. Prior to her death, on March 23, 1992, Baugh conveyed 
her interest in the two properties to Mackey by quitclaim deed. 
The events leading up to this conveyance were as follows. 
Beginning in early 1991, Baugh began telling Mackey that 
Baugh wanted Mackey to have the house that Baugh lived in (Trial 
Transcript Volume I at 120, 163). Baugh had asked Gleed to take 
his name off the warranty deed to her house and put Mackey's name 
on it, but he had refused (Trial Transcripts Volume I at 121-
124). Baugh began asking Mackey if she'd had the deed taken care 
of and Mackey would tell her that there was nothing she could do 
(Trial Transcript Volume I at 165). Baugh said she had already 
given Gleed enough of her assets (Trial Transcript Volume I at 
166). On March 12, 1992, Baugh told Mackey that she would just 
sign over her interest in both homes to Mackey and Gleed would 
have to work out something with her to get his home (Trial 
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Transcript Volume 1 at 166-68). Mackey then called Associated 
Title to make arrangements for the deed and an appointment for 
her grandmother (Trial Transcripts Volume I at 166-68). 
On March 23, 1992, Mackey accompanied Baugh to Associated 
Title where an associate of the company, Lori Brown, prepared the 
deed. Ms. Brown testified that Baugh understood the questions 
which were asked of her and appropriately answered those 
questions. (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 9). Baugh 
also appeared to Ms. Brown to be competent and to understand the 
nature of the proceeding where Baugh signed the quitclaim deed to 
Mackey (Id.). The quitclaim deed was recorded on March 24, 1992 
in the Office of the Davis County Recorder (Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law at 5). 
Following the March 23, 1992 conveyance, Gleed launched a 
campaign to get Baugh to ask for a return of the deed and for 
Mackey to return the properties to him and Baugh (Trial 
Transcripts Volume I at 173-76). When that was unsuccessful, 
Gleed initiated this lawsuit. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
1. Utah statutory and case law presumes that a duly 
executed and recorded deed presently conveys the full property 
interest that a grantor has. Persons attacking the validity of 
such a deed must do so by clear and convincing evidence. That 
Baugh presently conveyed her full interest in the properties to 
Mackey is evidenced in this case by the fact that: A) the 
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quitclaim deed was duly executed and recorded; B) the only 
neutral party present at the execution of the quitclaim deed— 
Lori Brown—stated Baugh understood the transaction and that she 
was conveying her property; C) there was no contradictory 
evidence indicating Baugh did not intend a present conveyance; 
and D) the trial court failed to take into account its finding 
that Baugh intended to give Mackey negotiating leverage over 
Gleed# which could not be done unless some property interest was 
presently conveyed. Additionally, the trial court failed to show 
in a logical manner that its findings of fact were clearly 
supported by the evidence; and the trial court misapplied the 
case law that it cited in support of its finding that no present 
property interest was conveyed. Therefore, Gleed failed to 
demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that Baugh did not 
intend a present conveyance to Mackey. 
2. Even if Baugh desired to retain possession of her home 
during her lifetime, that desire is not inconsistent with the 
grant of a present, vested remainder interest. Case law supports 
the Appellant's contention that a grantor can retain possession 
of a gift during her lifetime, yet the gift is still valid and 
binding and not testamentary in character. Therefore, even if 
Baugh did desire to retain possession of her house during her 
lifetime, she nevertheless gave Mackey a present and vested 
property interest when she executed and recorded the quitclaim 
deed. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT BAUGH 
INTENDED TO RETAIN ALL OWNERSHIP INTEREST 
POSSESSED BY HER IN THE BAUGH HOME, WITH THIS 
OWNERSHIP INTEREST TO NOT TRANSFER TO MACKEY UNTIL 
THE TIME OF BAUGH'S DEATH (FINDING 21a) AND IN 
THE RESULTING CONCLUSION THAT THE QUITCLAIM DEED 
TO MACKEY SHOULD BE SET ASIDE (CONCLUSION 14). 
That Baugh presently conveyed her entire interest in the 
properties to Mackey is shown by the following: A) A fee simple 
title is presumed to pass in a conveyance and delivery of a deed 
is presumed when it is executed and recorded; B) Self-serving 
testimony does not establish that the grantor intended the 
conveyance to be testamentary in nature; C) Where there is no 
contradictory evidence as to intent, the conveyance is presumed 
to be present and binding; D) The trial court failed to consider 
the significance of its finding that Baugh sought to place 
negotiating pressure on Gleed, and this intention would be 
defeated if no interest was presently conveyed to Mackey; and E) 
The trial court failed to show in a logical manner how its 
findings of fact were supported by the evidence, and incorrectly 
interpreted the cases that it relied on in support of its 
decision that Baugh lacked a present intent to convey her 
properties. These points will be discussed in turn. 
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A. A Fee Simple Title Is Presumed To Be Intended To 
Pass In A Real Estate Conveyance And When A Deed 
Is Executed And Recorded There Is A Presumption Of 
Delivery, Therefore, One Who Asserts The 
Invalidity Of A Deed Must Do So By Clear And 
Convincing Evidence, 
When Baugh signed the document boldly emblazoned with the 
title QUIT CLAIM DEED, she presently conveyed her entire interest 
in the Baugh properties to Mackey. The Utah Code states: "A fee 
simple title is presumed to be intended to pass by a conveyance 
of real estate, unless it appears from the conveyance that a 
lesser estate was intended." UTAH CODE UNANN. § 57-1-3 (1993). 
Moreover, "[a] presumption of delivery arises where the deed has 
been executed and recorded . . . ." Baker v. Pattee, 684 P.2d 
632, (Utah 1984) (upholding warranty deed because there was 
present intent to convey a property interest). "[0]ne who 
asserts the invalidity of a deed must so prove by clear and 
convincing evidence." Controlled Receivables, Inc. v. Harman, 
413 P.2d 807, 809 (Utah 1966); See also, Pattee, 684 P.2d at 634. 
As was stated in Allen v. Allen et al., 204 P.2d 458, 461 (Utah 
1949)(holding earlier conveyance by quitclaim deed was binding 
despite later conveyance), ,f[t]he recording of the deed and 
placing the names of others on the property is somewhat in the 
nature of a public declaration that [the grantor] intended the 
instrument to become effective immediately." 
A number of Utah cases have addressed the question of 
whether a deed is valid and binding because it is intended to 
have immediate effect, or invalid because it is testamentary in 
nature. In Controlled Receivables, Inc. v. Harman, 413 P.2d 807 
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(Utah 1966), a deed that had been recorded was held to have been 
delivered despite the fact the grantor retained possession of the 
deed and continued to occupy the home and pay taxes on it. 
Additionally, the Harman court pointed out the grantor's 
"testimony that he did not intend to pass title prior to his 
death is self-serving • . ." and was insufficient to overcome the 
presumption of delivery. 413 P.2d at 810. 
In First Security Bank of Utah v. Burgi et ux.. 251 P.2d 297 
(Utah 1952), a deed was held to be invalid because the grantor's 
intent was testamentary in nature. In Burgi the deed was not 
recorded until after the grantor's death and there was 
conflicting testimony about whether delivery of the deed had 
occurred or not. In O'Gara v. Findlay, 306 P.2d 1073 (Utah 
1957), however, the court declined to follow Burgi because there 
was no conflicting testimony about whether the grantor intended 
delivery, and the court stated: "[I]n order to make a finding 
that there was no delivery, the trial court would have to find 
against the uncontradicted testimony, but such finding we refuse 
to make." 
In Burt et al. v. Burt et a h , 209 P.2d 217 (Utah 1949), a 
deed was held invalid because the intent was testamentary in 
nature. However, there the deed was never recorded (despite 
being in the possession of the grantee) and the court stated that 
this was "[a] very strong point in favor . . . " of a finding the 
deed was testamentary. Id. at 220. Finally, in Allen v. Allen 
et al., 204 P.2d 458 (Utah 1949), where a deed was found to be a 
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valid present conveyance and not testamentary, the court pointed 
out, "[c]ertain it is, that [the grantor's] visit to her attorney 
. . . and her signing of a paper that bears in its caption—in 
large black letters—"Quit Claim Deed," would hardly lead one to 
believe she had • . . executed a will." 
Unlike in Burgi and Burt, the quitclaim deed from Baugh to 
Mackey was recorded promptly after being executed. The trial 
court found the March 23, 1992 quitclaim deed was duly recorded 
on March 24, 1992 (Findings of Fact and Conclusions Law at 5), 
well before Baugh's death on July 29, 1992. As indicated in 
Burt, this is strongly indicative of a present—not testamentary-
-intent to convey real estate. Moreover, while the trial record 
is silent on who took physical possession of the deed and when, 
there are indications it was given to Mackey. First, the 
quitclaim deed (which was admitted into evidence) states that tax 
notices should be sent to 2512 N 475 W, Sunset, which is Mackey's 
address. Additionally, a tax notice was sent to this address and 
Mackey planned to pay the taxes; however, before she could pay 
the taxes Gleed paid them and changed the address to which tax 
notices should be sent (Trial Transcript Volume II at 9-10). In 
any event, even if Baugh retained possession of the deed and had 
continued paying taxes, this would not necessarily indicate a 
lack of present intent to convey the property. Controlled 
Receivables, Inc. v. Harman, 413 P.2d 807 (Utah 1966). 
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B. Self-Serving Statements Are Insufficient To 
Overcome the Presumption of Delivery When A Deed 
Is Executed And Recorded Because They Are Not 
Clear And Convincing Evidence. 
Since the recording of a deed raises the presumption of a 
present intent to deliver the property—a presumption which is 
afforded "great and controlling weight . . ."—it was the 
respondent's burden to show Baugh did not intend a present 
conveyance. Harman. 413 P.2d at 809. Furthermore, the only 
disinterested party who was present when Baugh signed the 
quitclaim deed was Lori Brown, the associate of Associated Title 
who prepared the deed (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 
9). All other parties—Mackey, Baugh, Gleed—have a self-
interest regarding what was intended when Baugh signed and 
recorded the quitclaim deed. As was stated in Harman. self-
serving testimony about what was intended cannot overcome the 
presumption of delivery after a deed is recorded. 413 P.2d at 
810. Therefore, in determining what Baugh intended when she 
signed the quitclaim deed, Ms. Brown's testimony should be given 
controlling weight. 
Ms. Brown testified that on March 23, 1992, Baugh understood 
the questions which were asked of her and appropriately answered 
those questions (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 9). 
Under cross examination by respondent's counsel, Ms. Brown made 
the following statements (Trial Transcript Volume III at 187): 
Q All right. So if the question then essentially 
was, Mrs. Baugh, this is a quit claim deed and you 
understand that, and her answer was? 
A Yes. 
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Q Yes. And you understand by this quit claim deed 
you are transferring your ownership interest in these 
two properties to your—Penny Mackey, and she said yes? 
A Uh-huh. 
As was stated in Allen, it can hardly be implied a grantor is 
executing a will when she knowingly and willingly signs a 
document with the caption Quit Claim Deed emblazoned on it. 204 
P.2d at 460. 
Moreover, Ms. Brown's testimony was corroborated by Dr. 
Enoch Dangerfield (Trial Transcript Volume II at 157-58). And 
while Dr. Dangerfield indicated that on March 27, 1992 Baugh said 
she wanted the property back (Trial Transcript Volume II at 151-
53), when a grantor changes their intent after having made a 
binding conveyance, the conveyance remains valid and binding. 
See Allen v. Allen et al., 204 P.2d 458 (Utah 1949). 
Additionally, Baugh's statements that she wanted the property 
back apparently were brought about by deed's campaign to have 
the properties returned (Trial Transcripts Volume I at 173-76). 
The trial court placed substantial weight on the case of 
Curtiss v. Ferris, 452 P.2d 38 (Colo. 1969) when it concluded 
Baugh did not intend to convey a present property interest. 
(Ruling of Judge Memmott, August 25, 1993, at 12-13). However, 
in that case the grantor's self-serving testimony partially 
formed the basis for the decision. Moreover, the Ferris court 
stated "[t]he record is replete with other evidence consistent 
with [the grantor's] claim to retention of full interest in the 
property during her lifetime." 452 P.2d at 40. But unlike in 
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Ferris, the record in this case is hardly replete with indicia 
that Baugh did not intend to convey a present interest. 
Therefore the presumption of delivery and conveyance of all 
property interests upon signing and recording of the March 23, 
1992 quitclaim deed was not overcome by clear and convincing 
evidence. 
C. The Only Evidence Presented As To Baugh's Intent 
At The Time She Executed The Quitclaim Deed Was 
That She Intended To Convey An Ownership 
Interest. This Does Not Clearly And Convincingly 
Show Lack Of Present Intent To Transfer A Property 
Interest. 
In addition to the fact that self-serving testimony should 
be discounted when determing the intent of a grantor, it is also 
important to consider whether there is any contradictory 
testimony as to intent to make present delivery of a deed. If 
there is no contradictory testimony as to whether delivery of the 
deed was intended, then the signing of a deed is valid and 
binding. O'Gara v. Findlay, 306 P.2d 1073 (Utah 1957). In 
Findlay an elderly woman conveyed property by deed to her nephew. 
The nephew had been contacted by the elderly woman to aid in the 
disposition of her property and the nephew accompanied the 
decedent to a bank where the transaction was made. The only 
parties to the transaction were the decedent, the nephew, and the 
bank president who prepared the deed. At trial, the only 
testimony as to the decedent's intent was the uncontroverted 
testimony of the nephew and bank president that a present 
conveyance was intended by the decedent. On these facts the 
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court in Findlay held that a valid and binding present conveyance 
of the property had been made. 
Similarly, and as discussed above, Ms. Brown testified that 
Baugh understood she was transferring her property to Mackey by 
signing the quitclaim deed. Moreover, Mackey also testified that 
Baugh understood she was conveying her properties to Mackey by 
signing the quitclaim deed (Trial Transcript Volume I at 127, 
171-73). Baugh was the only other party present when the deed 
was signed, but the record is silent as to her intent at the time 
the deed was signed due to her death. Additionally, the 
presumption that Baugh intended a present conveyance is not 
negated by her later request to return the deed or expressed 
desire to continue to live in her house until her death. See, 
e.g., Baker v. Pattee, 684 P.2d 632, 634 (Utah 1984); Controlled 
Receivables, Inc. v. Harman, 413 P.2d 807 (Utah 1966); Allen v. 
Allen et al., 204 P.2d 458, 461 (Utah 1949). Since there was no 
contradictory evidence as to intent, there was no clear and 
convincing evidence that Baugh did not intend a present 
conveyance of the properties. Therefore Baugh's signing and 
recording of the quitclaim deed should be held to have been a 
valid and binding present conveyance. 
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D, The Trial Court Failed To Consider Its Finding 
Of Fact 21c, Which Shows That Baugh Must Have 
Intended To Transfer A Property Interest When She 
Executed And Delivered The Quitclaim Deed, 
The trial court ignored the significance of one of its 
findings of fact as it relates to whether a present interest was 
conveyed. The trial court found that when Baugh executed the 
quit claim deed she intended "to place negotiating pressure on 
the plaintiff Gleed to persuade him to convey to Mackey his joint 
tenancy ownership interest in the Baugh Home in exchange for 
Mackey conveying to him her joint tenancy ownership interest in 
the Rental Home." (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 6). 
However, nowhere does the trial court analyze the significance of 
that intention vis-a-vis whether a present property interest was 
conveyed to Mackey. In Sweeney v. Sweeney, 11 A.2d 806 (Conn. 
1940), where the purpose of making a deed was to protect the 
grantee in case he predeceased the grantor but there was a 
question as to whether effective delivery of the deed had 
occurred, the court said: "Since this purpose would have been 
defeated had there been no delivery with intent to pass title, 
this conclusively establishes the fact that there was legal 
delivery." Likewise, if no title was passed when Baugh signed 
the quitclaim deed, her intention of placing negotiating pressure 
on Gleed would have been defeated. Therefore, the trial court's 
finding that "no present ownership interest" in either home was 
conveyed (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 12) is 
inconsistent and in error. 
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E. The Trial Court Failed To Show In A Logical Manner 
That Its Findings Of Fact Clearly And 
Convincingly Established That Baugh Lacked A 
Present Intent To Transfer A Property Interest, 
Moreover, The Trial Court Incorrectly Applied The 
Case Law When It Concluded That Baugh Lacked A 
Present Intent To Transfer A Property Interest, 
The trial court found that Baugh was lucid when she executed 
the quitclaim deed, that she "acted with sufficient mental 
capacity to comprehend the subject of [the] deed, its nature and 
its probable consequences," and "acted with independent will and 
judgment." (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 6, 9). 
Additionally, the trial court found that the March 23, 1992 
quitclaim deed from Baugh to Mackey was not the product of fraud 
or undue influence. (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 
11). Despite these findings, the trial court ruled that Baugh 
lacked a present intent to transfer ownership of the properties, 
and in so doing mistakenly relied on the following cases. 
In Anderson v. Brinkerhoff, 756 P.2d 95 (Utah Ct. App. 
1988), which the trial court relied on strongly in finding Baugh 
did not presently intend to convey a property interest to Mackey 
(Ruling of Judge Memmott, August 25, 1993 at 10-11), the grantor 
was found to have been subject to the undue influence of her 
children and grandchildren. Because of this, the Brinkerhoff 
court ruled there was no present intent to transfer a property 
interest, and invalidated the conveyances. Yet Baugh did not 
suffer from undue influence from Mackey, so it is not clear how 
the trial court could use Brinkerhoff as support for its finding 
Baugh had no intent to make a present conveyance of her 
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properties. Moreover, the trial court also relied on Baker v. 
Pattee, 684 P.2d 632 (Utah 1984), reciting that delivery of a 
deed is not good without present intent to transfer a property 
interest (Ruling of Judge Memmott, August 25, 1993, at 12). 
While this is certainly the law, in Pattee a deed was held to be 
a valid and binding conveyance delivered with the necessary 
intent. Nevertheless, the trial court cited this case as support 
for its finding that Baugh lacked the appropriate intent. 
Finally, as discussed above, the trial court also incorrectly 
relied on Curtiss v. Ferris, 452 P.2d 38 (Colo. 1969) to support 
its conclusion Baugh lacked the necessary intent to transfer a 
present interest. 
These cases and the Findings of Fact fail to support the 
Conclusion of Law that Baugh lacked the necessary intent to make 
a present conveyance to Mackey. As mentioned above, the findings 
of fact show that Baugh was lucid, competent, understood the 
nature of the transaction, and was not subject to undue influence 
by Mackey. Moreover, the bulk of the findings of fact relate to 
Baugh's competence, not her intent. (Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, items 23 and 24, at 6-9). Finally, the trial 
court relied on written testimony and transcripts of 
conversations that were never admitted into evidence in reaching 
its decision (see Ruling of Judge Memmott, August 25, 1993 at 
12) . 
In Estate of Ashton v. Ashton, 804 P.2d 540, 542 (Utah 
Ct.App. 1990) (construing intent of a testator and the language 
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of a will), the court stated that: 
The findings "must show that the court's judgment or 
decree 'follows logically from, and is supported by, 
the evidence.'" The findings also "'should be 
sufficiently detailed and include enough subsidiary 
facts to disclose the steps by which the ultimate 
conclusion on each factual issue was reached.'" 
(citations omitted). 
Without sufficient information to allow adequate review, a 
case should be remanded for the trial court to make "explicit, 
detailed findings as to . . . the decedent's intent and how that 
intent supports the court's conclusions." Id. at 542-43. 
Similarly, the record in this case simply fails to logically, and 
clearly, support the trial courts ruling that Baugh lacked a 
present intent to convey her property interest. Therefore, as an 
alternative to finding the quitclaim deed was a valid and binding 
present conveyance, this Court should remanded this case for 
further proceedings. 
F. Conclusion. 
Since Baugh presently conveyed her entire interest in the 
properties, she severed the joint tenancy that Baugh and Gleed 
had shared and made Gleed and Mackey tenants in common. Close v. 
Adams, 16630 (Utah 1980) (per curiam). In Adams an elderly 
mother executed and delivered to her son a quitclaim deed to 
property held in joint tenancy with her daughter. The deed was 
valid, which severed the joint tenancy and made the son and 
daughter tenants in common. Moreover, Mackey is entitled to one-
half of the reasonable value of the use and occupation of the 
19 
properties. See First National Bank of Denver v. Groussman, 483 
P.2d 398, (Colo. Ct. App. 1971) (quitclaim deed to grandsons by 
elderly woman severed joint tenancy with daughter, making 
daughter and grandsons tenants in common). In the alternative, 
this case should be remanded for further findings regarding 
Baugh's intent at the time she executed the quitclaim deed. 
II. IN THE ALTERNATIVE, THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO 
CONSIDER THAT BAUGH'S DESIRE TO REMAIN IN HER HOME 
UNTIL HER DEATH CONSTITUTED AN INTENTION TO RETAIN A 
LIFE ESTATE, WHILE GIVING MACKEY A VESTED REMAINDER 
INTEREST IN THE PROPERTIES. 
The trial court failed to recognized that a valid and 
binding gift can be made where the grantor retains a life estate 
and possession of the gift, with a present remainder interest 
being conveyed to and vested in the grantee. "The correct test 
[of the validity of a gift] is "'whether the maker intended the 
[gift] to have no effect until after the maker's death, or 
whether he intended it transfer some present interest.'" " Gruen 
v. Gruen, 496 N.E.2d 869, 873 (N.Y. 1986)(citations omitted). 
"[W]ith the gift of a remainder[,] title vests immediately in the 
donee and any possession is postponed until the donor's death[,] 
whereas under a will neither title nor possession vests 
immediately." Id. at 874. And while Gruen dealt with whether a 
valid gift could be made where a life estate was retained in a 
valuable painting, the court also recognized that a valid gift of 
real property could be made despite retention of a life estate 
and possession by the grantor. Id. at 873. Moreover, in Gruen 
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the grantor did not specifically state that he was retaining a 
life estate, he simply stated in a letter to the grantee that he 
wanted to use the painting as long as he lived. Id. at 871. 
At the core of the trial court's error in failing to 
recognize that a valid present property interest was vested in 
Mackey upon execution and recordation of the quitclaim deed was 
the fact that it failed to clearly distinguish ownership from 
possession. The trial record makes it abundantly clear Baugh 
desired to live out her life in her home. However, as the Gruen 
court pointed out, simply wanting to retain possession of a gift 
during ones life does not indicate no present interest has been 
conveyed. Strength is added to this contention because Baugh 
also sought to place negotiating pressure on Gleed (Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law at 6) when she executed deed. Since 
no negotiating pressure could result unless Mackey had a valid 
present interest in the properties with which to bargain, and 
since it is admitted that Baugh wanted to retain possession of 
her house during her life, the only other logical explanation of 
her intent, if she did not intend to convey her full interest, is 
that she conveyed a present remainder interest in the properties 
to Mackey, but retained a life estate for herself. 
It is also admitted that the quitclaim deed does not 
explicitly retain a life estate while giving a remainder interest 
to Mackey (See Addendum No. 1). However, there is support for 
Appellants claim that this is what was intended. For example, 
the trial court stated H[a]nd I think clearly her intent 
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throughout this was that she maintain a life interest and it be 
her home during her life." (Ruling of Judge Memmott, August 25, 
1993 at 16)(emphasis added). As discussed above, when coupled 
with Baugh's intent to place negotiating pressure on Gleed the 
most logical explanation of this intent is that the "life 
interest" Baugh sought to retain was possession, not ownership. 
Likewise, when Mackey said her grandmother said "I want my 
granddaughter to have my home when I die" (Trial Transcripts 
Volume I at 127, 172) it is likely that Baugh wanted Mackey to 
assume possession of her home when she died, not ownership, which 
was conveyed when the quitclaim deed was executed and recorded. 
The case of Baker v. Pattee, 684 P.2d 632 (Utah 1984), also 
indicates that a possessory life estate can be retained even if 
it is not explicitly stated in a deed. In that case, the grantor 
"wanted assurance that she would always have a place to live in 
comfort in return for deeding the property [to the grantees]." 
Id. at 634. The deed, which was held to be valid and binding, 
was executed and the elderly woman continued to live in the house 
until she became too infirm; however, nowhere in Pattee is it 
stated that an explicit life estate was retained. 
Where a life estate is retained, a quitclaim deed severing a 
joint tenancy and creating a tenancy in common is valid. See 
First National Bank of Denver v. Groussman, 483 P.2d 398 (Colo. 
Ct. App. 1971). See also Allen v. Allen et al., 204 P.2d 458 
(Utah 1949). In Groussman, an elderly woman who was a joint 
tenant with her daughter executed a quitclaim deed to her 
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grandsons, reserving a life estate interest in the property for 
herself. The deed was held to be a valid present conveyance 
which severed the existing joint tenancy. The Groussman court 
went on to state: 
The instrument did not . . . vest the [grantees] with 
their interest in the property only upon the death of 
the grantor, but instead granted them a present, 
vested, non-revocable interest in the property at the 
time of the execution of the deed. There is no 
requirement that a deed comply with the statutory 
requirement of a will. 
483 P.2d at 402. As the Groussman court made clear, retaining 
full use and possession of property does not make a deed 
testamentary. That construction only arises if the grantor 
retains the right to terminate the interest of the grantee at any 
time before the grantor's death. Baugh did not retain any right 
to revoke the conveyance to Mackey since the deed was duly 
delivered and recorded to Mackey (see discussion above). 
Therefore, when Baugh executed the deed retaining an implied life 
estate for herself she: 1) Severed the joint tenancy she shared 
with Gleed; and 2) Vested Mackey with a present remainder 
interest in the property, making Mackey a tenant in common with 
Gleed upon Baugh's death. As discussed above, Mackey is 
therefore entitled to one half of the reasonable value of the use 
and occupation of the properties. See Id. at 402. 
23 
CONCLUSION 
The judgment of the trial court in setting aside the 
quitclaim deed to Mackey should be reversed and the validity of 
the deed upheld on the basis that: 1) There was no evidence to 
support the finding that Mackey did not have the requisite intent 
for a present transfer of her property interest to Mackey when 
she executed and recorded the deed on March 23, 1992; and 2) On 
the further basis that no such evidence attains the required 
standard of "clear and convincing." 
In the alternative, the case should be remanded to the trial 
court for further findings as to the basis for the court's 
conclusions and enunciation of the standard of proof used in 
reaching its findings and conclusions. 
A DATED this in day of July, 1994. 
Nathan Hult 
Attorney for Appellant 
110 North 100 East 
P.O. Box 543 
Logan, Utah 84323-0543 
(801)-753-7400 
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ADDENDUM 
March 23, 1992 Quitclaim Deed From Baugh to Mackey 
February 14, 1990 Warranty Deed From Baugh to Gleed and Baugh 
Judgment of Judge Jon M. Memmott 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
Ruling of Judge Memmott, August 25, 1993 
Gruen v. Gruen, 496 N.E.2d (N.Y. 1986) 
Sweeney v. Sweeney, 11 A.2d 806 (Conn. 806) 
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LOUISE L. BAUGH AND ERNEST K. GLEED, AS JOINT TENANTS, WITH FULL 
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grantee 
County , State of Utah 
TEN DOLLARS AND OTHER GOOD AND VALUABLE CONSIDERATION DOLLARS 
County, 
of 
for the turn of 
the following described tract of land in DAVIS 
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Notary Public 
Residing at 
A S S O C I A T E D TITLE C O M P A N Y My Comm.sslon Expires: 
Order No 
•>;vT'27;ffV 
FiLEDIN CLERK'S OFFICE 
JAH 27 3 2n PH f M 
PHILIP C. PATTERSON - 2540 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
427 - 27th Street 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Telephone: (801) 394-7704 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ERNEST K. GLEED AND LOUISE L. 
BAUGH, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
PENNY L. MACKEY, 
Defendant. 
J U D G M E N T 
) Civil No. 920700131 
Judge Jon M. Memmott 
This action was tried to the court without a jury on 
August 19 and 20, 1993. The plaintiff Ernest K. Gleed was 
present and represented by his retained attorney of record Philip 
C. Patterson. Verlin L. Gleed, in his capacity as the personal 
representative of the Estate of Louise L. Baugh, deceased, and as 
the substituted party plaintiff for Louise L. Baugh, was 
represented by Philip C. Patterson, one of the attorneys for the 
Estate of Louise L. Baugh, deceased. The defendant was present 
and represented by her attorney of record Jan P. Malmberg. The 
court announced its ruling from the bench before the parties and 
respective counsel on August 25, 1993. Plaintiffs filed with the 
court and served upon opposing counsel October 1, 1993 proposed 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment to which the 
JUDGMENT ENTERED 0 0 2 4 0 5 0 7 
BY t { - u s l _ _ _ 
CLERK, ^ . / : ! COl.kT 
BY 
DE~'Ur CLEP.X 
d e f e n d a n t f i l e d a n d s e r v e d w r i t t e n o b j e c t i o n s t o g e t h e r w i t h 
p r o p o s e d F i n d i n g s of F a c t , C o n c l u s i o n s of Law and J u d g m e n t . 
F o l l o w i n g a N o v e m b e r 9 , 1993 h e a r i n g b e f o r e t h e c o u r t , t h e 
p l a i n t i f f s f i l e d w i t h t h e c o u r t and s e r v e d on o p p o s i n g c o u n s e l 
t h e i r s e c o n d N o v e m b e r 2 4 , 1993 p r o p o s e d F i n d i n g s o f F a c t , 
C o n c l u s i o n s of Law and Judgment . D e f e n d a n t f i l e d w i t h t h e c o u r t 
a n d s e r v e d u p o n o p p o s i n g c o u n s e l h e r s e c o n d J a n u a r y 3 , 199^ 
o b j e c t i o n s t o t h e p l a i n t i f f s 1 s e c o n d November 2 4 , 1993 p r o p o s e d 
F i n d i n g s o f F a c t , C o n c l u s i o n s o f Law and J u d g m e n t w h i c h 
o b j e c t i o n s a d d i t i o n a l l y i n c l u d e d t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s p r o p o s e d 
F i n d i n g s o f F a c t , C o n c l u s i o n s of Law and Judgment . A t e l e p h o n e 
c o n f e r e n c e h e a r i n g was c o n v e n e d by t h e c o u r t t o g e t h e r w i t h 
c o u n s e l f o r t h e r e s p e c t i v e p a r t i e s on F r i d a y , J a n u a r y 14, 1994 to 
p r o v i d e f o r t h e e n t r y of F i n d i n g s of F a c t , C o n c l u s i o n s of Law and 
Judgment in t h i s a c t i o n . 
Based upon t h e r e c o r d on f i l e i n t h i s a c t i o n , a r g u m e n t s 
and o b j e c t i o n s made by r e s p e c t i v e c o u n s e l f o r t h e p a r t i e s a t t h e 
J a n u a r y 1 4 , 1994 h e a r i n g a n d f r o m t h e F i n d i n g s of F a c t and 
C o n c l u s i o n s of Law e n t e r e d by t h e c o u r t , 
THE COURT ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES AS FOLLOWS: 
1. The j o i n t t e n a n c y i n t e r e s t s c o n v e y e d by t h e p l a i n t i f f 
L o u i s e L. Baugh t o E r n e s t K. G l e e d u n d e r t h e F e b r u a r y 14, 1990 
w a r r a n t y d e e d d u l y r e c o r d e d i n t h e O f f i c e of t h e D a v i s C o u n t y 
R e c o r d e r on F e b r u a r y 1 4 , 1990 a s Ent ry No. 882819, in Book 1336, 
a t Page 0692 , t o t h e improved r e s i d e n t i a l r e a l p r o e r t y l o c a t e d a t 
00240503 
- 9 -
374 N o r t h 75 W e s t , C l e a r f i e l d , U t a h , and more p a r t i c u l a r l y 
d e s c r i b e d a s f o l l o w s : 
A l l of Lot 13 , Block 1, GRAND VIEW ACRES, a l s o t h e 
Nor th .30 f e e t of Lot 14. (Tax ID No. 1 4 - 0 9 1 - 0 0 1 3 ) . 
i s h e r e b y s e t a s i d e . 
2 . The j o i n t t e n a n c y i n t e r e s t c o n v e y e d by t h e p l a i n t i f f 
L o u i s e L. Baugh t o t h e p l a i n t i f f E r n e s t K. G l e e d u n d e r t h e 
F e b r u a r y 1 4 , 1990 w a r r a n t y d e e d d u l y r e c o r d e d i n t h e Of f i ce of 
t h e D a v i s C o u n t y R e c o r d e r on F e b r u a r y 1 4 , 1990 a s E n t r y No. 
8 8 2 8 1 9 , in Book 13 36 , a t Page 0 6 9 2 , to t h e improved r e s i d e n t i a l 
r e a l p r o p e r t y l o c a t e d a t 362 N. 75 W., C l e a r f i l e d , U t a h , and more 
p a r t i c u l a r l y d e s c r i b e d a s f o l l o w s : 
Al l of Lot 14, Block 1, GRAND VIEW ACRES, excep t t h e 
North .30 f e e t t h e r e o f . (Tax ID No. 1 4 - 0 9 1 - 0 0 1 4 ) . 
i s a v a l i d and e n f o r c e a b l e c o n v e y a n c e . 
3 . The March 2 3 , 1992 q u i t - c l a i m deed d u l y r e c o r d e d on 
March 2 4 , 1992 i n t h e O f f i c e of t h e D a v i s County R E c o r d e r a s 
E n t r y No. 9 6 4 0 8 3 , i n Book 1 4 8 1 , a t P a g e 0 0 0 3 , by w h i c h t h e 
p l a i n t i f f L o u i s e L. Baugh c o n v e y e d t o t h e d e f e n d a n t P e n n y ^ L . 
Makey h e r j o i n t t e n a n c y o w n e r h s i p i n t e r e s t i n t h e i m p r o v e d 
r e s i d e n t i a l r e a l p r o p e r t y l o c a t e d a t 374 N o r t h 7 5 W e s t , 
C l e a r f i e l d , Utah , and in t h e i m p r o v e d r e s i d e n t i a l r e a l p r o p e r t y 
l o c a t e d a t 362 N o r t h 75 W e s t , C l e a r f i e l d , U t a h , which r e a l 
p r o p e r t i e s a r e more p a r t i c u l a r l y d e s c r i b e d a s f o l l o w s : 
Al l of Lot 14, Block 1, GRAND VIEW ACRES, excep t 
t h e North .30 f e e t t h e r e o f . 
00240509 
All of Lot 13, Block 1, GRAND VIEW ACRES, also the 
North .30 feet of Lot 14. 
Tax Id Nos. 14-091-0014 and 14-091-0013-
i s set as ide 
4 . E a c h p a r t y s h a l l b e a r a t t o r n e y f e e s a n d c o s t s 
i n d i v i d u a l l y i n c u r r e d . 
5 . Each p a r t y s h a l l b e a r c o s t s i n d i v i d u a l l y i n c u r r e d . 
DATED t h 
• • & i s ( 3 5 "~ day of 3 ^ , 1994 
HONORABLE JON N THE" I'  " M. MEMMOTT 
D i s t r i c t Cour t Judge 
00240510 
A<&d^wcV v \ c \ VJLWV KJ O H 
r i L c D ! . V C L ~ R r ' ^ f j r r ^ , -
PHILIP C. PATTERSON - 2540 
PATTERSON & BARKING 
Attorneys for P l a i n t i f f s 
427 - 27th Street 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Telephone: (801) 394-7704 
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FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
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This action was tried to the court without a jury on 
August 19 and 20, 1993. The plaintiff Ernest K. Gleed was 
present and represented by his retained attorney of record Philip 
C. Patterson. Verlin L. Gleed, in his capacity as the personal 
representative of the Estate of Louise L. Baugh, deceased, and as 
the substituted party plaintiff for Louise L. Baugh, was 
represented by Philip C. Patterson, one of the attorneys for the 
Estate of Louise L. Baugh, deceased. The defendant was present 
and represented by her attorney of record Jan P. Malmberg. The 
court announced its ruling from the bench before the parties and 
respective counsel on August 25, 1993. Plaintiffs filed with the 
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Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment to which the 
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p l a i n t i f f s f i l e d w i t h t h e c o u r t and s e r v e d on o p p o s i n g c o u n s e l 
t h e i r s e c o n d N o v e m b e r 2 4 , 1993 p r o p o s e d F i n d i n g s of F a c t , 
C o n c l u s i o n s of Law and Judgment . D e f e n d a n t f i l e d w i t h t h e c o u r t 
a n d s e r v e d u p o n o p p o s i n g c o u n s e l h e r s e c o n d J a n u a r y 3 , 1994 
o b j e c t i o n s t o t h e p l a i n t i f f s ' s e c o n d November 2 4 , 1993 p r o p o s e d 
F i n d i n g s o f F a c t , C o n c l u s i o n s o f Law a n d J u d g m e n t w h i c h 
o b j e c t i o n s a d d i t i o n a l l y i n c l u d e d t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s p r o p o s e d 
F i n d i n g s of F a c t , C o n c l u s i o n s of Law and Judgmen t . A t e l e p h o n e 
c o n f e r e n c e h e a r i n g was c o n v e n e d by t h e c o u r t t o g e t h e r w i t h 
c o u n s e l f o r t h e r e s p e c t i v e p a r t i e s on F r i d a y , J a n u a r y 14, 1994 t o 
p r o v i d e f o r t h e e n t r y of F i n d i n g s of F a c t , C o n c l u s i o n s of Law and 
Judgment i n t h i s a c t i o n . 
B a s e d u p o n t h e r e c o r d on f i l e i n t h i s a c t i o n , and 
a r g u m e n t s and o b j e c t i o n s made by r e s p e c t i v e c o u n s e l f o r t h e 
p a r t i e s a t t h e J a n u a r y 14, 1994 h e a r i n g , 
THE COURT ENTERS THE FOLLOWING: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. T h i s a c t i o n was commenced on A p r i l 2 4 , 1992. 
2 . A l l p a r t i e s t o t h i s a c t i o n a r e r e s i d e n t s of D a v i s 
County , U t a h . 
3 - The p l a i n t i f f Louise L. Baugh d i e d on J u l y 29 , 1992 a t 
t h e age of s e v e n t y - e i g h t (78) y e a r s . 
- ? -
4 . V e r l i n G l e e d , t h e d u l y a p p o i n t e d and a c t i n g p e r s o n a l 
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of t h e E s t a t e of L o u i s e L. Baugh ( D a v i s C o u n t y 
D i s t r i c t C o u r t Case No, 923700146 ES) ha s been s u b s t i t u t e d a s a 
p a r t y p l a i n t i f f . 
5 . The p l a i n t i f f Ernest K. Gleed i s one of five surviving 
children of Louise L. Baugh, deceased. 
6 . The d e f e n d a n t P e n n y L. M a c k e y i s a g r a n d c h i l d o f 
Lou i se L. Baugh. 
7 . L o u i s e L, Baugh was t h e widow of P e r c y B a u g h . No 
c h i l d r e n were born a s i s s u e of t h i s m a r r i a g e . P e r c y Baugh d i e d 
on J a n u a r y 7 , 1990. 
8 . D u r i n g t h e l a t e 1 9 5 0 f s , t h e B a u g h s a c q u i r e d j o i n t 
t e n a n c y o w n e r s h i p of c e r t a i n i m p r o v e d r e s i d e n t i a l r e a l p r o p e r t y 
l o c a t e d a t 374 N. 75 W., C l e a r f i e l d , U tah , which r e a l p r o p e r t y i s 
more p a r t i c u l a r l y d e s c r i b e d a s f o l l o w s : 
A l l of Lot 13 , Block 1, GRAND VIEW ACRES, a l s o t h e 
North .30 f e e t of Lot 14. (Tax ID No. 1 4 - 0 9 1 - 0 0 1 3 ) . 
The Baughs o c c u p i e d c o n t i n u o u s l y t h i s p r o p e r t y ("The Baugh Home") 
a s t h e i r r e s i d e n c e u n t i l P e r c y B a u g h ' s J a n u a r y 7 , 1990 d e a f h . 
L o u i s e Baugh c o n t i n u e d t o c o c c u p y t h i s home u n t i l he r J u l y 2 9 , 
1992 d e a t h . 
9 . D u r i n g t h e f i r s t p a r t o f t h e 1 9 6 0 ' s , t h e B a u g h s 
a c q u i r e d j o i n t t e n a n c y owner sh ip of t h e improved r e s i d e n t i a l r e a l 
p r o p e r t y l o c a t e d a t 362 N. 75 W., C l e a r f i e l d , U t a h , which r e a l 
p r o p e r t y i s more p a r t i c u l a r l y d e s c r i b e d a s f o l l o w s : 
A l l of Lot 14, Block 1, GRAND VIEW ACRES e x c e p t t h e 
North .30 f e e t t h e r e o f . (Tax ID No. 1 4 - 0 9 1 - 0 0 1 4 ) . 
T h i s p r o p e r t y i s a d j a c e n t t o and s o u t h of The Baugh Home, The 
B a u g h s r e n t e d c o n t i n u o u s l y t h i s p r o p e r t y ( "The R e n t a l Home" ) 
u n t i l Percy Baugh 1s J a n u a r y 7 , 1990 d e a t h . 
1 0 . L o u i s e Baugh h a d b e e n r e c e i v i n g m e d i c a l d o c t o r 
t r e a t m e n t f o r c h r o n i c l u n g d i s e a s e p r i o r t o and f o l l o w i n g h e r 
h u s b a n d ' s J a n u a r y 7 , 1990 d e a t h . 
1 1 . F o l l o w i n g P e r c y B a u g h ' s J a n u a r y 7 , 1990 d e a t h and 
d u r i n g t h e same m o n t h , E r n e s t K. G l e e d t e r m i n a t e d h i s N e v a d a 
e m p l o y m e n t and moved i n t o The R e n t a l Home t o p r o v i d e day t o day 
c a r e f o r h i s m o t h e r . 
1 2 . On F e b r u a r y 14, 1990, L o u i s e Baugh e x e c u t e d a w a r r a n t y 
deed by w h i c h s h e c o n v e y e d i n j o i n t t e n a n c y t o h e r s e l f and t o 
E r n e s t K. G l e e d The B a u g h Home a n d The R e n t a l Home. T h i s 
F e b r u a r y 14, 1990 w a r r a n t y deed was d u l y r e c o r d e d i n t h e O f f i c e 
of t h e D a v i s Coun ty R e c o r d e r on F e b r u a r y 1 4 , 1990 a s Ent ry No. 
882819 , in Book 1336 a t Page 692 . 
13* When e x e c u t i n g t h e F e b r u a r y 14, 1990 w a r r a n t y d e e d , 
L o u i s e Baugh i n t e n d e d : 
( a ) t o t h e n c o n v e y t o E r n e s t K. G l e e d a j o i n t t e n a n c y 
i n t e r e s t i n The R e n t a l Home, and 
( b ) t o r e t a i n a l l o w n e r s h i p i n t e r e s t p o s s e s s e d by he r in 
The Baugh Home w i t h t h i s o w n e r h s i p i n t e r e s t t o no t t r a n s f e r t o 
Gleed u n t i l t h e t ime of h e r d e a t h . 
14 . At t h e t i m e L o u i s e Baugh e x e c u t e d t h e F e b r u a r y 1 4 , 
1990 d e e d , s h e : 
- 4 -
( a ) a c t e d w i t h s u f f i c i e n t m e n t a l c a p a c i t y t o comprehend 
t h e s u b j e c t o f t h i s d e e d , i t s n a t u r e a n d i t s p r o b a b l e 
c o n s e q u e n c e s , and 
(b ) a c t e d wi th an i n d e p e n d e n t w i l l and j u d g m e n t . 
15. L o u i s e B a u g h ' s c h r o n i c l u n g d i s e a s e r e s u l t e d i n h e r 
i n - p a t i e n t h o s p i t a l i z a t i o n d u r i n g J a n u a r y 1990 and November 1990. 
16. From Penny Mackey ' s e a r l y c h i l d h o o d y e a r s u n t i l 1 9 8 2 , 
s h e f r e q u e n t l y l i v e d i n The Baugh Home f o r e x t e n d e d p e r i o d s of 
t i m e , s p e n t s e v e r a l summers l i v i n g i n The Baugh Home and a l w a y s 
remained t h e f a v o r i t e g r a n d d a u g h t e r of t h e Baughs . 
17. Penny Mackey r e s i d e d i n t h e S t a t e of U t a h i n t o y e a r 
1985 when s h e and h e r husband moved from t h e s t a t e because of h i s 
c a r e e r c o m m i t m e n t s . The M a c k e y s r e t u r n e d p e r m a n e n t l y t o t h e 
S t a t e of Utah d u r i n g November 1990. 
1 8 . F o l l o w i n g h e r November 1990 r e t u r n t o t h e S t a t e of 
U t a h , P e n n y Mackey c o n t i n u e d h e r c l o s e r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h h e r 
g r a n d m o t h e r wh ich r e l a t i o n s h i p i n c l u d e d b a t h i n g L o u i s e Baugh 
o n c e o r t w i c e a w e e k , s e e i n g h e r a s much a s p o s s i b l e and 
p r o v i d i n g Lou i se Baugh wi th a f f e c t i o n and c o m p a n i o n s h i p . 
19- On March 2 3 , 1992, L o u i s e Baugh e x e c u t e d a q u i t - c l a i m 
d e e d by w h i c h s h e c o n v e y e d t o Penny Mackey h e r e n t i r e j o i n t 
t e n a n c y o w n e r s h i p i n t e r e s t i n The Baugh Home and The Ren ta l Home. 
20 . The March 23 , 1992 q u i t - c l a i m deed was d u l y r e c o r d e d 
on March 2 4 , 1992 in t h e O f f i c e of t h e Dav i s County Recorder a s 
En t ry No. 964083 in Book 1481 a t Page 0 0 0 3 . 
- 5 -
2 1 . When e x e c u t i n g t h e March 2 3 , 1992 q u i t - c l a i m d e e d , 
Lou i se Baugh i n t e n d e d : 
( a ) t o r e t a i n a l l o w n e r s h i p i n t e r e s t p o s s e s s e d by h e r in 
The Baugh Home w i t h t h i s o w n e r h s i p i n t e r e s t t o n o t t r a n s f e r t o 
Mackey u n t i l t h e t ime of Baugh 1 s d e a t h , 
( b ) t o l e a v e u n d i s t u r b e d h e r i n t e n t i o n t h a t t h e F e b r u a r y 
1 4 , 1990 w a r r a n t y deed had c o n v e y e d t o G l e e d a j o i n t t e n a n c y 
owner sh ip i n t e r e s t in The R e n t a l Home, and 
( c ) t o p l a c e n e g o t i a t i n g p r e s s u r e on t h e p l a i n t i f f G l e e d 
t o p e r s u a d e him t o c o n v e y t o Mackey h i s j o i n t t e n a n c y o w n e r s h i p 
i n t e r e s t in The Baugh Home i n e x c h a n g e f o r Mackey c o n v e y i n g t o 
him he r j o i n t t e n a n c y owne r sh ip i n t e r e s t in The R e n t a l Home. 
2 2 . L o u i s e Baugh had l u c i d p e r i o d s and had t h e a b i l i t y t o 
u n d e r s t a n d . She had a l u c i d p e r i o d on March 2 3 , 1992 when she 
e x e c u t e d t h e March 2 3 , 1992 q u i t - c l a i m d e e d . 
2 3 . The p l a i n t i f f G l e e d p r e s e n t e d t h e f o l l o w i n g e v i d e n c e 
t o i n d i c a t e t h e d e c e a s e d , L o u i s e B a u g h , was n o t c o m p e t e n t on 
March 2 3 , 1992 t o q u i t - c l a i m h e r i n t e r e s t in The Baugh Home and 
The R e n t a l Home: 
( a ) D r . Alan A b d u l l a , L o u i s e Baugh 1 s t r e a t i n g p h y s i c i a n , 
t e s t i f i e d t h a t because of h e r d i s e a s e , h e r b e h a v i o r , and h e r C02 
l e v e l s , s h e d i d n o t h a v e t h e r e q u i s i t e men ta l c a p a c i t y t o make a 
deed on March 2 3 , 1992, 
( b ) D r . A b d u l l a had n o t s e e n L o u i s e Baugh p r i o r t o he r 
a p p o i n t m e n t t h e day a f t e r t h e March 2 3 , 1992 q u i t - c l a i m d e e d 
- 6 -
t r a n s f e r f o r a period of seven months and was not v i s i t i n g her on 
a cont inual b a s i s , 
( c ) D r . A b d u l l a had a n u r s e v i s i t i n g M r s , Baugh and 
i n d e p e n d e n t m e d i c a l p e r s o n s w e r e s e e i n g M r s . Baugh on a d a i l y 
b a s i s . The t e s t i m o n y of an o n - g o i n g m e d i c a l c a r e p r o v i d e r was 
not p r e s e n t e d t o t h e c o u r t , 
( d ) M r s . Geneva B a x t e r , a n e i g h b o r and f r i e n d of Louise 
Baugh of f i f t y p l u s y e a r s , t e s t i f i e d t h a t s h e b e l i e v e d L o u i s e 
Baugh d id n o t have t h e r e q u i s i t e m e n t a l c a p a c i t y , 
( e ) M r s . Bruna C o f f e y , a n e i g h b o r and f r i e n d of L o u i s e 
Baugh of t h i r t y - f i v e y e a r s , t e s t i f i e d she b e l i e v e d Louise Baugh 
d i d n o t h a v e t h e r e q u i s i t e m e n t a l c a p a c i t y t o u n d e r s t a n d t h e 
n a t u r e of t h e t r a n s a c t i o n , a s a l s o d id Nancy McEntee, a n e i g h b o r , 
( f ) D i a n a G l e e d , E r n e s t G l e e d ! s w i f e , t e s t i f i e d L o u i s e 
Baugh would h a v e i n s t a n c e s of l a c k of memory and i n a b i l i t y t o 
perform c e r t a i n t a s k s , 
( g ) L o u i s e B a u g h f s s o n s , L a r r y G l e e d , V e r l i n Gleed and 
James G l e e d , l i k e w i s e t e s t i f i e d a s t o t h e l a c k of m e n t a l c a p a c r i t y 
a l t h o u g h t h e i r t e s t i m o n y c a r r i e d l e s s w e i g h t and was l e s s 
c o n v i n c i n g b e c a u s e of t h e i r l a c k of f r e q u e n t c o n t a c t w i t h L o u i s e 
Baugh , and 
( h ) E r n e s t Gleed l i k e w i s e t e s t i f i e d t h a t h i s mother had 
l a c k of memory and l a c k of c a p a c i t y t o u n d e r s t a n d . Howeve r , Mr. 
G l e e d ! s t e s t i m o n y had s u b s t a n t i a l i n c o n s i s t e n c i e s . He t e s t i f i e d 
i n t h e s p r i n g of 1992 t h a t L o u i s e Baugh would d i s c u s s w i t h him in 
g r e a t d e t a i l t h e t r a n s a c t i o n t h a t o c c u r r e d i n r e l a t i o n t o a 
S u n s e t home w h i c h h* d been p r e v i o u s l y p u r c h a s e d by Penny Mackey 
from her g r a n p a r e n t s - He a l s o t e s t i f i e d t h a t L o u i s e Baugh had 
had c o n v e r s a t i o n s w i t h t h e d e f e n d a n t Mackey a f t e r which L o u i s e 
Baugh would r e l a t e t o t h e p l a i n t i f f G l e e d , i n g r e a t d e t a i l , t h e 
n a t u r e of t h e c o n v e r s a t i o n s , t h e r e n t money t h a t was owed, t h e 
a m o u n t s f o r r e n t money t h a t was owed, and o t h e r d e t a i l s w h i c h 
were i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h E r n e s t d e e d ' s p r i o r t e s t i m o n y t h a t she 
could not c a r r y on a c o n v e r s a t i o n and c o a l d n o t u n d e r s t a n d t h e 
n a t u r e of l e g a l t r a n s a c t i o n s , 
2 4 . The d e f e n d a n t Mackey, on t h e o t h e r hand , p r e s e n t e d t h e 
f o l l o w i n g t e s t i m o n y t o i n d i c a t e L o u i s e Baugh was c o m p e t e n t on 
March 2 3 , 1992 t o t r a n s f e r a o n e - h a l f i n t e r e s t in The Baugh Home 
and in The R e n t a l Home: 
( a ) D r . E n o c h D a n g e r f i e l d t e s t i f i e d t h a t M r s . L o u i s e 
Baush was c o m p e t e n t , u n d e r s t o o d t h e n a t u r e of c o n v e r s a t i o n s , and 
p a r t i c u l a r l y u n d e r s t o o d t h e n a t u r e of t h e t r a n s a c t i o n of March 
2 3 , 1992 and t h e deed t r a n s f e r , b a s e d on h i s r e v i e w of r e c o r d e d 
t r a n s c r i p t s o f c o n v e r s a t i o n s w i t h L o u i s e Baugh and t h e 
d e p o s i t i o n s of t h e p a r t i e s , 
( b ) t h e t r a n s c r i p t s we re l i k e w i s e r ev i ewed by t h e c o u r t 
and w e r e q u i t e p e r s u a s i v e t h a t M r s . B a u g h was c o m p e t e n t , 
u n d e r s t o o d t h e n a t u r e of c o n v e r s a t i o n s and u n d e r s t o o d t h e n a t u r e 
of t h e deed t r a n s a c t i o n , 
( c ) Mr. W i l l i a m H a d f i e l d , a f r i e n d of over t h i r t y y e a r s 
and work a s s o c i a t e of Mr. P e r c y Baugh , t e s t i f i e d t h a t L o u i s e 
B a u g h u n d e r s t o o d b u s i n e s s t r a n s a c t i o n s and t h e t r a n s f e r of 
p r o p e r t y , 
( d ) J e a n R o b b i n s , a f r i e n d o f L o u i s e Baugh and an 
a s s o c i a t e f o r o v e r t h i r t y y e a r s , and who had r e c e i v e d t r a i n i n g 
h e r s e l f from L o u i s e Baugh , t e s t i f i e d t o t h e c o u r t t h a t L o u i s e 
Baugh had a s i g n i f i c a n t u n d e r s t a n d i n g of b u s i n e s s t r a n s a c t i o n s , 
( e ) L o r i Brown, t h e a s s o c i a t e of A s s o c i a t e d T i t l e who 
p r e p a r e d t h e d e e d , t e s t i f i e d t h a t on March 2 3 , 1992, Mrs. Baugh 
u n d e r s t o o d t h e q u e s t i o n s w h i c h w e r e a s k e d o f h e r a n d 
a p p r o p r i a t e l y a n s w e r e d t h o s e q u e s t i o n s . L o u i s e Baugh a l s o 
a p p e a r e d t o he r t o be competent and u n d e r s t o o d t h e n a t u r e of t h e 
p r o c e e d i n g . 
2 5 . Whi l e t h e p r o g r e s s i o n of L o u i s e B a u g h ' s lung d i s e a s e 
had s u b j e c t e d h e r t o t h e l o s s o f i n t e l l e c t u a l a n d m e m o r y 
f u n c t i o n s a t t h e t i m e s h e e x e c u t e d t h e March 2 3 , 1992 q u i t - c l a i m 
s h e : 
( a ) a c t e d w i t h s u f f i c i e n t m e n t a l c a p a c i t y t o comprehend 
t h e s u b j e c t o f t h i s d e e d , i t s n a t u r e a n d i t s p r o b a b l e 
c o n s e q u e n c e s , and 
(b) a c t e d w i th an i n d e p e n d e n t w i l l and judgment . 
26 . Lou i se B a u g h f s c h r o n i c l u n g d i s e a s e n e c e s s i t a t e d h e r 
i n - p a t i e n t h o s p i t a l i z a t i o n d u r i n g A p r i l 1992 and i m m e d i a t e l y 
p r e c e d i n g h e r J u l y 2 9 , 1992 d e a t h . 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1 . The j u r i s d i c t i o n and v e n u e of t h i s a c t i o n a r e e a c h 
p r o p e r l y v e s t e d w i th t h i s c o u r t . 
2
* The p r e s u m p t i o n under Utah Law i s t h a t Lou i se Baugh i s 
compe ten t u n l e s s c l e a r and c o n v i n c i n g e v i d e n c e i s p r e s e n t e d t o 
t h e c o u r t which e s t a b l i s h e d i n c o m p e t e n c y . 
3 . The p l a i n t i f f s f a i l e d t o e s t a b l i s h w i t h c l e a r a n d 
c o n v i n c i n g e v i d e n c e t h a t Lou i se B a u g h ' s m e n t a l f a c u l t i e s were so 
d e f i c i e n t o r impa i red a t t h e t i m e of t h e e x e c u t i o n of t h e March 
2 3 , 1992 q u i t - c l a i m deed t h a t she d'id no t comprehend t h e s u b j e c t 
of t h e deed, i t s n a t u r e and i t s p r o b a b l e c o n s e q u e n c e s and c o u l d 
not a c t wi th d i s c r e t i o n i n r e l a t i o n t h e r e t o . 
4 . Lou i s e L. Baugh p o s s e s s e d s u f f i c i e n t m e n t a l c a p a c i t y 
t o e x e c u t e bo th t h e Februa ry 14, 1990 w a r r a n t y deed and the March 
2 3 , 1992 q u i t - c l a i m d e e d . 
5 . The p l a i n t i f f E r n e s t K. Gleed o c c u p i e d a r e c o g n i z e d a t 
law c o n f i d e n t i a l r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h h i s m o t h e r , L o u i s e L. Baugh , 
a t t h e t i m e t h e F e b r u a r y 14 , 1990 w a r r a n t y deed was e x e c u t e d by 
h e r . 
6 . The d e f e n d a n t Penny Mackey o c c u p i e d a r e c o g n i z e d a t 
law c o n f i d e n t i a l r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h h e r g r a n d m o t h e r , L o u i s e L. 
B a u g h , a t t h e t i m e t h e l a t t e r e x e c u t e d t h e March 2 3 , 1992 
qui t - c l a i m d e e d . 
7 . As a named j o i n t t e n a n c y g r a n t e e in t h e February 14, 
1990 w a r r a n t y deed , E r n e s t K. Gleed b e n e f i t e d from t h e d e s c r i b e d 
r e a l p r o p e r t y c o n v e y a n c e . 
A Ac,
 f . ^A g r a n t e e w i t h i n t h e March 2 3 , 1992 quit-* 
u
 •
 A
^ cne narn^ 
c l a i m d e e d , p e n n y M ^ k e y b e n e f i t e d f rom t h e d e s c r i b e d r e a l 
p r o p e r t y conveyance* 
9 . In s flinch a s a c o n f i d e n t i a l r e l a t i o n s h i p e x i s t e d 
between Ernes t K. Gleed and L o u i s e Baugh and between Penny Mackey 
and L o u i s e Baugh, e a c h p a r t y had t h e b u r d e n of p r o v i n g t h e 
t r a n s a c t i o n tfas f a i r a n d n o t t h e r e s u l t o f f r a u d o r u n d u e 
i n f l u e n c e . 
10. Neither the February 14, 1990 warranty deed nor the 
March 23, 1992 quit-claim deed were obtained from Louise Baugh as 
a result of fraud. No elements of fraud were raised or proved. 
11. The deed transactions were not the result of undue 
influence. Neither the February 14, 1990 warranty deed nor the 
March 23, 1992 quit-claim deed were obtained from Louise Baugh as 
a product of undue influence. 
12. The joint tenancy interest in The Baugh Home conveyed 
by the plaintiff Louise Baugh to the plaintiff Ernest K. Gleed 
under the February 14, 1990 warranty deed should be set aside a*s 
a null and void conveyance for the reason that Baugh did not then 
intend to convey to Gleed a present joint tenancy ownership 
interest in this property. 
13- The joint tenancy interest in The Rental Home conveyed 
by the plaintiff Louise Baugh to the plaintiff Ernest k. Gleed 
under the February 14, 1990 warranty deed should be deemed 
a valid and enforceable conveyance for the reason that Baugh did 
n o t t h e n i n t e n d t o c o n v e y t o G l e e d a p r e s e n t j o i n t t e n a n c y 
o w n e r s h i p i n t e r e s t in t h i s p r o p e r t y . 
14. The March 23 1992 q u i t - c l a i m deed shou ld be s e t a s i d e 
f o r t h e r e a s o n t h a t Louise L. Baugh d id no t t h e n i n t e n d t o convey 
t o Penny L. Mackey a p r e s e n t o w n e r s h i p i n t e r e s t i n e i t h e r The 
Baugh Home or The Renta l Home. 
1 5 . Each p a r t y s h o u l d b e a r a t t o r n e y f e e s i n d i v i d u a l l y 
i n c u r r e d . 
1 6 . Each p a r t y s h o u l d b e a r c o u r t c o s t s i n d i v i d u a l l y 
i n c u r r e d . 
DATED t h i s 5 5 - day o f " 3 , 199^ 
T T ^ J Y L nl\qAM^^ 
THE HONORABLE JON M. MEMMOTT 
District Court Judge 
IN THW-ISTRTCT COURT OF THE SEC( Dl STRICT OF THE 
2 
3 
4 
STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF DAVTS 
l\AJl^w4 Uwv K J O . -ST 
5 LOUISE L. BAUGH, ERNEST K. GJ.EEU. 
6 PLAINTIFF, 
7 
8 
9 
10 
CARE NO 920700 1 I^ 
VS. 
PENNY MACKBY, 
DEFENDANT. 
11 BE TT REMEMBERED THAT ON THE 20TH DAY OF 
AUGUST, 1993, THE ABOVE-ENTITLED CAUSE CAME ON FOR TRIAL 
12 BEFORE THE HONORABLE JON M. MEMMOTT, DISTRICT JUDGF, 
FARMINGTON, UTAH. 
13 
FOR THE PLAINTIFF 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 FOR THE DEFENDANT 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
APPEARANCES 
PHI 1.1.7 P C PATTERSON 
PATTERSON & BARKTNG 
427 27TH STREET 
OGDEN, UT 84401 
JAN P. MA1.MRERG 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
29 WEST 100 NORTH 
LOGAN, UT 84321 
JOANNE PRATT, CSR 
HALL OF JUSTICE 
800 WEST STATE STREET 
FARMINGTON, UT 84025 
COP* 
I 
2 AUGUST 2b, 1993. 
3 THE COURT: THE COURT IS HERE TO ISSUE A 
4 RULING FOLLOWING THE BENCH TRIAL IN ERNEST GLEED VERSUS 
5 PENNY MACKEY, CIVIL 920700131. JUST A COUPLE OF COMMENTS 
6 ABOUT EVIDENCE AND TRIAL THAT THE COURT CONSIDERED THAT I 
7 THINK I NEED TO CLARIFY BEFORE I ISSUE THE RULING. IN 
8 THIS, DEPOSITIONS WERE PUBLISHED, BUT LAST EVENING AND 
9 THIS MORNING WHEN I WENT TO GET THE DEPOSITIONS TO REVIEW 
10 THEM, THEY HAD NOT BEEN FILED WITH THE COURT. AND SO I 
31 DIDN'T HAVE ANY DEPOSITIONS TO READ EVEN THOUGH THEY HAD 
12 BEEN PUBLISHED, AND SO I WAS NOT ABLE TO READ THE 
13 DEPOSITIONS. IT WAS SOMETHING I WOULD LIKE TO DO AND I 
14 THINK IT WOULD HAVE BEEN IMPORTANT. BUT I HAVEN'T BEEN 
15 ABLE TO DO THAT BECAUSE THEY WERE NOT FILED AND HADN'T 
16 BEEN FILED, THE ORIGINALS, WITH THE COURT. AND SO I 
17 DON'T KNOW WHERE THEY ARK OR WHERE THEY MIGHT HAVE BEEN. 
18 BUT THEY WERE NOT Fr LED WITH THE COURT. THE OTHER THING 
19 I THINK I WANT TO CLARIFY BEFORE I ISSUE THE RULING IS 
20 THAT I THINK EARLY IN THE PLEADINGS, THERE WAS A PLEADING 
21 THAT THERE WAS LACK OF CONSIDERATION FOR PENNY MACKEY IN 
22 RECEIVING THE HOME. AND ONE -- AND THAT AS A RESULT 
2i THERE WAS ---- I THINK MUCH OF THE EVIDENCE AND I THINK 
24 MAYBE UNFORTUNATELY V N THIS CASE, AT LEAST FROM THE 
25 COURT'S PERSPECTIVE IN LISTENING TO THE CASE AND THE 
2 
1 TRIAL, MOcfl^' THE EVIDENCE AND THE T J ^ K OF THIS TRIAL 
2 WAS WHO DESERVED TO GET THE HOME, WHO HAD DONE THE MOST 
3 FOR LOUISE AND AS A RESULT WHO DESERVED THE HOME. AND I 
4 THINK THAT WAS UNFORTUNATE IN THE WAY THE EVIDENCE WAS 
5 PRESENTED IN THE TRIAL BECAUSE I DON'T BELIEVE THAT WAS 
6 AN ISSUE IN THIS CASE. AND I THINK IT COLORED OR CREATED 
7 SOME PROBLEMS IN DEALING WITH THIS THAT PROBABLY 
8 SHOULDN'T HAVE BEEN CREATED IN THIS TYPE OF TRIAL. 
9 WITH THAT THEN, THE COURT WILL MAKE THE 
10 FOLLOWING RULING IN THE CASE. FIRST, I THINK THE ISSUES 
11 THAT ARE BEFORE THE COURT — THERE WERE THE ISSUES OF 
12 COMPETENCY OF LOUISE BAUGH AND THE ISSUE OF UNDUE 
13 INFLUENCE OF PENNY MACKEY. AND THEN WITH THAT, I THINK 
14 THE COURT HAS FOUND AN ADDITIONAL ISSUE THAT I THINK WAS 
15 CRITICAL IN THE COURT'S DECISION, AND THAI' WAS WHETHER 
16 THERE WAS AN ATTEMPT TO TRANSFER PRESENT INTEREST IN THE 
17 PROPERTY WHEN THE DEEDS WERE CONVEYED, AND NOT JUST THE 
18 IN.LT.IAli DEED HUT PKOBAHLY THE 1990 DEED JN ADDITION. 
19 WITH THAT THE COURT USED THE FOLLOWING STANDARD OF REVIEW 
20 SO THAT YOU ARE AWARE OF THE REVIEW THAT THE COURT USED 
2 1. IN DEALING WITH THIS. AS TO COMPETENCY, THE COURT 
22 BELIEVES THAI' THE BEST STANDARD OK THE BEST SUMMARY OF 
2 3 THE STANDARD AS SET FORTH IN ANDERSON VERSUS BRINKERHOFF, 
24 A'J' 7 5b P. 2D 95 WHICH r-& A UTAH COURT OF APPEALS DECISION 
25 JN 1988. AND IN THAT, THE LAW THAT GUIDES THE COURT IN 
"* 
1 DEALING WT^P THIS IS WHETHER THE LAW I^JSUMES COMPETENCY 
2 RATHER THAN 1NCOMPETENCY. SO THE PRESUMPTION IS THAT 
3 MRS. BAUGH WAS COMPETE UNLESS PROVED TO THE CONTRARY AS 
4 PRESENTED. AND THAT ALSO ESTABLISHE'S THAT "MENTAL 
5 COMPETENCY MUST BE ESTABLISHED BY CLEAR, COGENT 
6 SATISFACTORY AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE.11 "THE TEST 
7 WHETHER A GRANTOR HAS SUFFICIENT MENTAL CAPACITY TO MAKE 
8 A DEED \S WHETHER THE MENTAL FACULTIES WERE SO DEFICIENT 
9 OR IMPAIRED THAT THERE WAS NOT SUFFICIENT POWER TO 
10 COMPREHEND THE SUBJECT OF THE DEED, ITS NATURE AND ITS 
11 PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES, AND TO ACT WITH THE DISCRETION IN 
3 2 RELATION THERETO." AND THEN JT CITES PETERSON VERSUS 
13 CARTER. AND ALSO "CAPACITY IS MEASURED AT THE TIME OF 
14 THE EXECUTION OF THE CONTRACT." AND JT ALSO GOES ON TO 
15 STATE THAT "NEITHER OLD AGE, SICKNESS OR EXTREME DISTRESS 
lb INCAPACITATES A PARTY FROM DJSPOSING OF HIS PROPERTY IF 
17 HE HAS POSSESSION OF HIS MENTAL FACULTIES AND UNDERSTANDS 
18 THE BUSINESS IN WHICH HE IS ENGAGED." 
19 AND IN THAT REGARD, 1 THINK THERE IS 
20 SIIBSTANTI AL CONFLICTING EVIDENCE THAT WAS PRESENTED 
21 BEFORE THE COURT AS TO THE ISSUE OF COMPETENCY. I THINK 
22 THE PLAINTIFF PRESENTED EVIDENCE BASED ON THAT STANDARD, 
23 WHICH WOULD LND1CATE THAT LOUISE BAUGH*S MENTAL FACULTIES 
24 WERE SO DEFICIENT THAT—SHE DID NOT HAVE THE POWER TO 
25 COMPREHEND TMK SUBJECT OF THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THE DEED. 
4 
1 AND 1 ' ^ N K MOST OF THE TESTIMONY ^ i T THE PLAINTIFF 
2 PRESENTED HAD TO DO WITH HER UNDERSTANDING OF THE 
3 PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES AND JUST LACK OF CAPACITY OR 
4 UNDERSTANDING OF DEEDS AND WHAT THEY MEANT TO CONVEY. I 
5 THINK IN DR. ABDULLA'S OPINION THAT HE BELIEVED HER 
6 BEHAVIOR, BECAUSE OF HER DISEASE AND PARTICULARLY HER C02 
7 LEVELS, PREVENTED HER FROM HAVING THE CAPACITY. THE 
8 COURT, IN EVALUATING DR. ABDULLA'S TESTIMONY, HAD SOME 
9 CONCERN OF THE FACT THAT HE HADN'T SEEN HER FOR 
10 APPROXIMATELY SEVEN MONTHS AND WAS NOT VISITING ON A 
LL CONTINUAL BASIS. THE COURT ALSO HAD SOME CONCERN WITH 
L2 THAT EVIDENCE AND THE FACT THAT HE HAD A NURSE VISITING 
li HER AND SHE HAD CARE OF THE NURSES. AND THAT TESTIMONY 
14 WAS NOT RECEIVED BY THE COURT. AND THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE 
It) OK THK PEOPLE -- AN INDEPENDENT MEDICAL PERSON THAT SAW 
16 HER ON A DAILY BASIS WAS NOT BEFORE THE COURT. PLAINTIFF 
17 ALSO PRESENTED TESTIMONY MRS. GENEVA BAXTER, A NEIGHBOR, 
18 WHO ALSO BELIEVED THAT SHE DID NOT HAVE THE CAPACITY 
J 9 BASED ON HKR hO PLUS YEARS IN FRIENDSHIP. BRUNA COFFEY, 
20 A NEIGHBOR OK i5 YEARS, .INDICATED THAT SHE DID NOT FEEL 
2 1 SHE HAD THE CAPACITY AT THE TIME OF THE EXECUTION TO 
22 UNDERSTAND THE NATURE OF THK TRANSACTION, AS DID ALSO 
23 NANCY MOINTEK, A NEIGHBOR. ERNIE'S WIFE, DIANA GLEED, 
24 ALSO TESTIFIED LlKEWd^E AND J THJNK GAVE SEVERAL EXAMPLES 
25 OK INSTANCES OK LACK OF MEMORY, THE INABILITY TO PERFORM 
1 CERTAJN^wSKS. THE COURT ALSO RECITED THE TESTIMONY OF 
2 THE SONS LARRY GLEED, VERLLN GLEED AND JAMES GLEED WHO IN 
3 RELATION TO THAT TESTIMONY I THINK PROBABLY CARRIED LESS 
4 WEIGHT AND LESS CONVINCING THAN OTHER TESTIMONY BECAUSE 
5 OF THEIR LACK OF CONTACT. AND 1 THINK THEIR CONTACT WAS 
6 ISOLATED COMPARED TO THE OTHER PARTIES. THE COURT ALSO 
7 IN REVIEWING MR. ERNIE GLEED'S TESTIMONY IN WHICH HE 
8 LNDiCATED SEVERAL EXAMPLES OF INCONSISTENT OR BEHAVIOR 
9 THAT SHOWED LACK OK MEMORY, LACK OF CAPACITY TO 
10 UNDERSTAND, THAT THE COURT ALSO FOUND SOME SUBSTANTIAL 
11 I NCONSJ STENCIES IN MR. GLEED'S TESTIMONY AS TO MRS. 
12 HAUGH'S UNDERSTANDING BECAUSE IN CERTAIN OCCASIONS I 
13 THINK HE INDICATED AND TESTIFIED THAT THERE WERE TIMES IN 
J 4 WHICH --- IN THE SPRING Oh 1992 — IN WHICH MRS. LOUISE 
JS HAUGH WOULD DISCUSS WITH HIM IN GREAT DETAIL THE 
lb TRANSACTIONS THAT OCCURRED IN RELATION TO THE SUNSET 
17 HOME ALSO THAT MRS. LOUISE BAUGH HAD HAD CONVERSATIONS 
18 WITH PENNY FOLLOWING THOSE CONVERSATIONS WITH PENNY, 
19 MRS. HAUGH WOULD RELATE TO MR. GLEED THE NATURE OF THE 
20 CONVERSATIONS, THE RENT MONhY WAS OWED, THE AMOUNT OF 
2 1 RENT MONEY THAT WAS OWED, DETAILS THAT TO THE COURT WERE 
22 (JUITE INCONSISTENT WITH THE PRIOR TESTIMONY THAT SHE 
2 1 COULD NOT CARRY ON SUCH CONVERSATION. SHE COULDN'T 
24 REMEMBER DETAILS. SR+, COULDN'T UNDERSTAND THE NATURE OF 
25 THE TRANSACTION. AND THE COURT FOUND SOME OF THE 
6 
1 C O N V E R S ^ l (mS RELATING TO SOMK J SS^T> TO BE INCONSISTENT 
2 WLTh THE OVERALL MKI) I CAJ. F I N D I N G S THAT DR. ABDULIiA HAD 
3 iNDICATKD. 
4 ON THE OTHER SIDE, THE DEFENDANTS HAVE 
5 PRESENTED EVIDENCE FROM \)R. DANGERFJELD BASED ON 
b TRANSCRIPTS AND OTHERS. AND WITH THAT THE COURT, BECAUSE 
7 THEY WERE ADMITTED, TOOK THE OPPORTUNITY TO REVIEW THE 
8 TRANSCRIPTS. AND IN REVIEWING THE TRANSCRIPTS, I THINK 
y THE TRANSCRIPTS TO THE COURT ARE (JUJTE PERSUASIVE THAT TN 
0 CONVERSATIONS AND IN SUBJECT MATTER, IN REVIEWING THOSE 
L TRANSCRIPTS, AT LEAST AT THE TIME OF THE TRANSCRIPT OF 
2 MARCH A'l , AND THE TIME WOULD INDICATE TO THE COURT THAT 
'5 MRS LOUISE BAUGH WAS COMPETENT, UNDERSTOOD THE NATURE OF 
4 THE CONVERSATIONS AND PARTICULARLY UNDERSTOOD THE NATURE 
h OH THE TRANSACTION AND THE DEED. THAT THE DEED HAD BEEN 
h DEEDED OVER AND THAT THERE WAS A DEED TO THE PROPERTY. 
7 ALSO THE COURT RECEIVED TESTIMONY FROM MR. WILLIAM 
H HADE I ELD, THE NEIGHBOR OR HKIhifll) OF OVER 10 YEARS AND 
9 WORK ASSOCIATE, GENERAL ROBBINS, WHO HAD BEEN A FRIEND 
0 AND ASSOCIATE FOR OVER 3() YEARS AND WHO HAD RECEIVED 
i TRAINING hROIl MRS. LOUISE BAUGH ABOUT BUS J NESS ACTJLVITLES 
2 AND BUSINESS VENTURES, WOULD INDICATE TO THE COURT THAI1 
'* MRS LOMiSh HAUGH HAD A SIGNIFICANT UNDERSTANDING OF 
4 BUSINESS TRANSACT IONS* AND THAT -- AND THE TESTIMONY Ob 
ft \it< . DANGERMELD WITH THE TRANSCRIPTS, THE COURT DOES NOT 
7 
J FTN1) ' ^ | T THE PLAINTIFF HAS SUST/^£D THEIR BURDEN OF 
2 CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE THAT MRS. LOUISE BAUGH WAS 
3 INCOMPETENT ON MARCH 23RD, 1992, WHEN THE DEED WAS 
4 EXECUTED. AND TH[S JS PARTICULARLY TRUE IN LIGHT OF THE 
b TESTJMONY OF LORLE BROWN WHO INDICATED THAT SHE COULD 
6 ANSWKR THE (JUESTIONS, THAT SHE APPEARED COHERENT AND 
7 UNDERSTOOD THE NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS. 
8 ON THAT BASIS AS TO THE CLAIM OF WHETHER 
9 MRS. LOUISE BAUGH WAS INCOMPETENT, THE COURT DOES NOT 
JO b'lND THAT THERE HAS BEEN PRESENTED CLEAR AND CONVINCING 
li EVIDENCE TO THIS COURT THAT SHE WAS INCOMPETENT, AND ON 
12 THAT DATE. I THINK THERE WAS A CONFLICT OF THE EVIDENCE 
J 3 AND THE COURT WOULD FIND FACTUALLY THAT IT APPEARS THAT 
14 LOlirSE BAUGH HAD PERIODS IN WHICH SHE WAS LUCID AND HAD 
lb THE ABILITY TO UNDERSTAND AND SHE ALSO HAD PERIODS IN 
16 WHICH SHE HAD DETERIORATING MEMORY. BUT I THINK AS THE 
17 CASES POINT OUT, 1 THINK CLEARLY, SHE WAS VERY ILL, AND 
18 SHE HAD SOME MEMORY LOSS. AND SHE HAD A NUMBER OF 
19 THINGS, BUT NOT TO THE POINT Ob BEING INCOMPETENT TO 
2U UNDERSTAND THE NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS, 
2 1 AS TO THE ISSUE Ot% UNDUE INFLUENCE, THE COURT 
22 BELIEVES THAT THE STANDARD SET FORTH IN VON HAKE IS THE 
2\ STANDARD THAT REALLY SHOULD BE APPLIED TO THIS CASE. AND 
24 THAT IS 70b P. 2D 7tftir, UTAH SUPREME COURT 1985. IT 
2b INDICATED THAT THE LAW -- ON PAGE 769 SAID THAT, "THE 
8 
1 LAW PR^P>MES THAT ONE ORDINARILY l^ES HIS OR HER OWN 
2 JUDGMENTS, HOWEVER IMPERFECT, AND ACTS ON THEM; IT DOES 
3 NOT READILY ASSUME THAT ONE'S WILL HAS BEEN OVERBORNE BY 
4 ANOTHER. THEREFORE, THE LAW DOES NOT LIGHTLY RECOGNIZE 
5 THE EXISTENCE OF A CONFIDENTIAL RELATIONSHIP. HOWEVER, 
6 IF A CONFIDENTIAL RELATIONSHIP .IS FOUND TO EXIST BETWEEN 
7 PARTIES, ANY TRANSACTION THAT BENEFITS THE PARTY IN WHOM 
8 THE TRUST IS REPOSED XS PRESUMED TO HAVE BEEN UNFAIR AND 
9 TO HAVE RESULTED FROM UNDUE INFLUENCE AND FRAUD." "THE 
10 PARTY THEN BEARS THE BURDEN OF PERSUADING THE FACT FINDER 
11 BY A PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE THAT THE TRANSACTION 
12 WAS IN FACT FAIR AND NOT THE RESULT OF FRAUD OR UNDUE 
13 INFLUENCE. IF THAT BURDEN tS NOT CARRIED, THE 
14 TRANSACTION WILL HE SET ASJDE. AND IN THIS CASE, I 
15 THINK IT \S CLEAR FROM THE STANDARDS THAT BOTH ERNIE 
lb Gl.EED AND PENNY MACKEY HAD A CONFIDENTIAL RELATIONSHIP 
17 WITH LOUISE BAUGH. I DON'T THINK THERE'S ANY QUESTION 
18 ABOUT THE TESTIMONY THAT THEY BOTH HAD A VERY CLOSE 
19 CONFIDENTIAL RELATIONSHIP WITH HER. IN THAT INSTANCE, 
20 WHERE THERE HAS BEEN A TRANSACTION, AND I THINK IT WAS 
2 1 RAISED BY THE PLAINTIFF ON CLOSING ARGUMENT, THAT THERE 
22 MAY BE A STRONG ARGUMENT TO SET ASIDE THE DEED IN 1990 OR 
23 THE SAME TYPE OF PRESUMPTION HAD THAT BEEN AN ISSUE IN 
24 THE CASE. I DON'T THINK THAT'S BEFORE US OR NOT AN ISSUE 
2*S IN THE CASE. BUT I THINK WITH THE CONFIDENTIAL 
9 
1 R E L A T ^ S H J P , THE COURT FINDS THA^fHERE WAS, BASED ON 
2 PENNY'S TESTIMONY, BASED ON REALLY EVERYONE'S TESTIMONY, 
3 THAT THERE WAS A STRONG CONFIDENTIAL RELATIONSHIP 
4 EXLSTING. AND THEREFORE, THERE'S A PRESUMPTION THAT IT 
5 IS UNFAIR AND WAS A RESULT OF UNDUE INFLUENCE AND THE 
6 BENK> TTJ NG PARTY THEN HAS THE BURDEN BY THE 
7 PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE THE TRANSACTION WAS FAIR 
8 AND NOT THE RESULT OF FRAUD OR UNDUE INFLUENCE. AND IN 
9 THAT CASE, THE COURT DOES NOT BELIEVE THAT IT WAS A 
10 RESULT OF FRAUD. I'M NOT GOING TO — I DON'T THINK THERE 
11 WAS EVEN ANY ELEMENTS RAISED OF FRAUD. AND SO THE COURT 
12 LS NOT ADDRESSING THE FRAUD ELEMENT BECAUSE IT'S NOT. 
13 HUT THE niJKSTION OF UNDUE INFLUENCE, WAS THERE UNDUE 
14 INFLUENCE AND THE NATURE OF THAT. AND IN THAT REGARD, 
15 THE COURT HAS BEEN PARTICULARLY INTERESTED IN THE CASE OF 
J 6 ANDERSON VERSUS BRINKERHOFF. THE ISSUE RAISED IN THAT 
17 CASE DEALT W LTH THE QUEST LON OF (JNDUE INFLUENCE AND 
18 STATED -- JT SAYS ON PAGE IOC) IN TALKING, IT SAYS, "WE 
19 AGREE WITH THE TRIAL COURT THAT THERE WAS SUFFTCLENT 
20 EVIDENCE THAT ELSTE LACKED THE REQUISITE INTENT TO 
2 1 TRANSFER HER PROPERTY WHEN SHE SIGNED THE 1979 AND 1980 
22 CONVEYANCES. SHE SIGNED THE DOCUMENTS AS A RESULT OF 
2 3 INFLUENCE EXERTED UPON HEK BY HER CHILDREN AND 
24 GRANDCHLI.nKKN, IN AN APPARENT ATTEMPT TO PLEASE THEM." 
25 "WHEN THE DEED IS EXECUTED WITH NO INTENT TO 
10 
3 /TRAAIsflR PRESENT INTEREST PROPER'lW IT IS INVALID." 
2 "COURTS HAVE CONSEQUENTLY HELD THAT A CONVEYANCE IS 
3 VALID ONLY UPON UPON DELIVERY OK A DEED WITH PRESENT 
4 INTEREST TO TRANSFER. INTENTION IS THE ESSENCE OF 
5 DELIVERY AND IS OF PRIMARY AND CONTROLLING IMPORTANCE. 
6 "THE GRANTOR'S PRESENT INTENT MUST BE TO PASS HIS OR HER 
7 TITLE INTEREST TO THE GRANTEE AND DIVEST HIMSELF OF THE 
8 SAME, OTHERWLSE THE PURPORTED DEED JS NOT VALID OR 
9 EFFECTIVE." AND JT WENT ON TO INDICATE IN THAT CASEr IT 
JO SAYS, "THE FACTS SURROUNDING THE EXECUTION OF THE DEEDS 
Jl JN 1979 AND 1980 INDICATE THAT ELSIE LACKED THE NECESSARY 
12 JNTENT TO TRANSFER PROPERTY." 
n IN THIS CASE, THE COURT WOULD FIND THE 
14 FOLLOWING h ACTS IN RELATION TO THE INTENT. I THINK IT 
15 HAS HEECJ THE TESTIMONY IN THIS CASE THAT THE INTENT OF 
lb LOUISE HAUGH HOTH TO THE 1990 TRANSFER AND I TH TNK BUT 
17 ALSO TO THE 1992 TRANSFER WAS TO CONVEY HER HOME UPON HER 
18 DEATH. 1 THINK THE TESTIMONY, PARTICULARLY THE 
I 9 TRANSCRIPTS OF THE TESTIMONY THAT WERE TAKEN ON MARCH 27 
20 AND JUNE 3RD, TESTIMONY OF PENNY, TESTLMONY OF HER 
2\ tlUSHANl) HOB, IN THIS CASE, INDICATED THAT THE 
:>..> CONVERSATIONS AND THE INTENT OF MRS. LOUISE BAUOH WAS TO 
23 TRANSFER THE HOME TO PENNY AT HER DEATH. THAT SHE WANTED 
24 PENNY TO HAVE THE HOME WHEN SHE J) IED. I THINK THE 
25 INTENT WHEN THEY WERE TRANSFERRED TO ERNIE GLEED WAS THAT 
13 
1 HE W(^P,D HAVE -- I THTNK THERE \JW THE INTENT TO CLEARLY 
2 THE INTENT TO TRANSFER THE HOME HE LIVED IN AT THE TIME 
3 HE I.TVED IN IT AND THAT WAS HTS HOME. BUT AS TO HER 
4 HOME, L THINK THE INTENT WAS TO TRANSFER IT AT HER DEATH. 
5 f THINK THAT WAS CLEARLY THE INTENTION. I DON'T THINK 
6 SHE EVER WAVERED FROM THAT. IN READING THE TRANSCRIPTS 
7 AND READING ALL THE TESTCMONY, THAT WAS WHAT LOUISE 
8 HAUGH WANTED TO DO IS DEAL WITH THIS AS TESTAMENTARY 
9 FASHION UPON HER DEATH. AND TN THAT REGARD, IN THE UTAH 
10 CASE BAKER VERSUS PATTEE AT 684 P.2D 632, AND IT STATES 
11 ]N THAT CASE AND IN A SIMJLAR CASE WHERE THEY DEALT WITH 
12 WHAT APPEARS TO A DEED WHEN THE INTENT WAS TO TRANSFER AN 
II INTEREST AT DEATH AND WHEN YOU WANT TO MAINTAIN AN 
14 INTEREST IN THE PROPERTY DURING YOUR LTFE. AND fNDICATES 
\b THAT ON PAGE 614, "PLAINTIFF CONTENDS THAT THE DEED WAS 
16 NOT DELIVERED AND ACCEPTED WTTH THE REQUISITE LEGAL 
17 INTENT, AND THAT AT BEST IT MUST BE VIEWED TO BE A 
18 CONVEYANCE TN TRUST." THAT WAS FUTURE LNTEREST THAT'S 
19 BEING TRANSFERRED IN THAT CASE. IT SAID, "WHERE A DEED 
20 IS EXECUTED WITH NO INTENT TO TRANSFER A PRESENT 
21 INTEREST, IT WILL BE INVALIDATED BY A COURT TN EQUITY. 
22 THIS COURT HAS HELD THAT A CONVEYANCE rs VALID ONLY UPON 
2 "5 DELIVERY OK A DEED WITH PRESENT INTENT TO TRANSFER." AND 
24 THEN THE COURT C [M'FTS WTTH APPROVAL A COLORADO CASE, 
?.*> CIIRTISS VERSUS FERRTS. AND I THTNK THE CURTTSS VERSUS 
12 
1 EERR1S W i S E iS VERY SIMILAR TO THE^ASE THAT WE'RE 
2 DEALING WITH IN THIS CASE AND IT WAS A COLORADO CASE AT 
1 4Sf> P.2D 38. AND IN THAT CASE, THERE WAS A GRANDMOTHER, 
4 A MOTHER AND A DAUGHTER AND THE MOTHER — GRANDMOTHER SET 
5 ASIDE A DEED THAT SHE SJGNED LN JOINT TENANCY FROM THE 
6 MOTHKK TO THE GRANDDAUGHTKK JN THE HOME THAT WAS HER HOME 
7 TO LIVE IN DURING HER LIFE. AND HER INTENT WAS TO 
8 TRANSFER fT AT HER DEATH. THAT WAS THE INTENT. AND IN 
9 THAI' CASE, THE COLORADO CASE WHICH HAS BEEN CITED BY 
10 AUTHORITY IN UTAH, THE COLORADO LAW SET ASIDE THE 
11 CONVEYANCE AND TRUST IN THE CASE. BUT IT SAID IN THE LAW 
12 IN COLORADO WHICH HAS BEEN APPROVED IN UTAH THAT, "AN 
]1 INTENT TO PASS A PRESENT INTEREST IS AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT 
14 IN DELIVERY OF PROPERTY. AND WHEN "THE EVIDENCE 
15 KSTABLJSUES THAT ONE DOES NOT INTEND TO PASS SUCH A 
16 PRESENT INTEREST JN PROPERTY THAT AS BETWEEN THE PARTIES, 
17 THERE'S NO B1NDJNG DELIVERY EVEN THOUGH THE DEED IS 
18 RECORDED." "IT IS ALSO THE RULE OF LAW WHEN ONE INTENDS 
IS A DEED TO HE OPERATIVE ONLY OH THE GRANTOR'S DEATH, THE 
JO GRANTOR MAY HAVE THE DEED SET ASIDE AS TO THE GRANTEE." 
J I "ANOTHER RULE OF LAW APPLICABLE TO THIS CASE IS THAT 
22 PRIME FACIE EVIDENCE OF DELIVERY THAT ARISES FROM 
2\ RECORDING MAYBE REBUTTED BY EVIDENCE SHOWING A LACK OF 
,M INTENT TO TRANSFER A~*"PRESKNT INTEREST IN THE PROPERTY." 
?.S THE COURT BELIEVES THAT THE EVIDENCE IN THIS CASE, BASED 
13 
1 ON TH^J/ESTIMONY OF ALL OK THE P^TlES, BOTH PLAINTIFF 
2 ANJ) DEFENDANT, WOULD CONVEY THAT THE INTEREST TO BE 
3 TRANSFERRED IN LOUISE BAUGH'S HOME WAS NOT A PRESENT 
4 INTEREST BUT WAS A FUTURE INTEREST. AND AS SUCH, THE 
5 COURT WOULD FIND PURSUANT TO THE CASE LAW THAT THE 
6 TRANSFER AND CONVEYANCE OF MARCH 23RD, 1992, SHOULD BE 
7 SET ASIDE BECAUSE IT WAS NOT THE TNTENT OF LOUISE BAUGH 
8 TO TRANSFER A PRESENT INTEREST IN HER HOME. AND AS SUCH, 
9 THE DEEDS ARE NOT VALID AS TO THE HOME. 
10 NOW, THE ISSUE THAT — AND I'M NOT SURE WHERE 
11 TO DEAL WITH BEFORE THE COURT BUT BASED ON THE 
12 EVIDENCE, - AND I'M NOT EVEN SURE IT'S AN TSSUE. MAYBE 
1 *  WE DEAL WITH IT FURTHER, BUT 1 THINK THE SAME FACTUAL 
14 SITUATION MIGHT APPLY TO THE 1990 DEED; NOT TO THE HOME 
15 THAT MR. GLEED LIVES \U, BUT TO MRS. LOUISE BAUGH*S HOME 
16 BECAUSE I THLNK THE TESTJMONY BEFORE THE COURT IN THAT 
17 CASE ALSO WAS THAT SHE INTENDED TO HAVE A LIFE INTEREST 
18 IN THE HOME AND IN THAT CASE IT MAY BE THAT CONVEYANCE 
19 ALSO IS NOT A VALID CONVEYANCE WHICH WOULD — THE DEED 
20 WOULD REMAIN TN MRS. LOUISE BAUGH'S AND BE SOMETHING 
2 1 THAT WOULD HAVE TO GO THROUGH THE ESTATE. GIVEN THE 
22 EVIDENCE —- AND I'M NOT SURE I'M SETTING AS A COURT OF 
23 EQUITY AND MAYBE YOU PARTIES WOULD WANT TO ADDRESS THAT 
24 OR HAVE FURTHER HN>KKI NO OU HERE. BUT GIVEN THE FACTS 
2*S THAT THE COURT HAS SEEN, AND CONCLUSIONS THAT I'VE 
14 
1 REACHKi^Pl THTNK THAT'S A FAIRLY I J W A L CONCLUSION BASED 
1 2 ON THE LAW THAT'S IN THE STATE OF UTAH. WITH THAT I 
3 GUESS, — AND WITH THAT ARE THERE QUESTIONS? I THINK 
4 WITH THAT THEN, THE COURT WOULD GRANT JUDGMENT IN FAVOR 
5 OF THE PLAINTIFFS TO SET ASTDE THE DEED, THE MARCH 22ND 
6 DEED, BUT IN THAT REGARD, IF .IT JS PROPERLY BEFORE THE 
7 COURT AS JUST AS TO THE LOUISE BAUGH HOME, THE COURT 
8 WOULD ALSO SET ASIDE THE 1990 DEED UNDER THE SAME 
9 RATIONALE AND SET OF FACTS; THE STATE OF MIND OF MRS. 
10 LOUISE BAUGH AS TO HER INTENT WHEN SHE MADE THAT 
U TRANSFER. 
J 2 MR. PATTERSON: YOU ARE ORDERING THAT TOO. 
L3 THE COURT: WELL, 1 DON'T KNOW IF I HAVE THE 
14 AUTHORITY TO DO THAT FOR THAT BEFORE THE COURT. I'M 
L5 SITTING AS A COURT OF EQUITY WHICH IS — AND I PROBABLY 
16 WOULD RESEARCH TT AND L DON'T KNOW. 
17 MK. PATTERSON: WOULD THAT NOT BE AN LSSUE THAT 
18 THE HEIRS WOULD RAISE SAYING THAT — 
19 THE COURT: JT MAY BE. IT MAY BE OUTSIDE THE 
20 JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT BECAUSE THAT CONVEYANCE IS NOT 
21 DLRECTLY BEFORE THE COURT. 
22 MRS. MALMBERG: I THINK THAT THE COURT SETTING 
2 3 ASIDE HER CONVEYANCE IT HAS TO LOGICALLY SET ASH)E THE 
2 4 OTHER ONE TOO. 
25 THE COURT: WELL, IF I HAVE JURISDICTION TO DO 
15 
1 THAT. P A M NOT SURE THAT 1 HAVE rM[ JURISDICTION SITTING 
2 AS A COURT OF EQUITY TO DO THAT. SO MAYBE THAT'S AN 
3 ISSUE THAT NEEDS TO BE BRIEFED AND I NEED TO FURTHER RULE 
4 SUBSEQUENT TO THIS. GIVEN THE FACTS, AND THE FACT 
5 SLTDATI ON THAT I HAVE FOUND AS TO HER INTENT AND WHAT THE 
6 CONVEYANCES WERE AS TO HER HOME, AND W[TH THAT, I WOULD 
7 LTKE TO MAKE JUST SO THE RECORD IS CLEAR. I THINK THE 
8 EVTDENCE CLEARLY SHOWED TO THE COURT THE MONEY PAID, THE 
9 CHECKS AND HISTORY THAT THE HOME THAT PENNY MACKEY LIVES 
10 IN NOW WAS THE HOME THAT WAS INTENDED TO BE PURCHASED AND 
J L WAS PURCHASED BY HER AND WAS NOT A GIFT. SHE HAS PAID 
J 2 FOR THAT HOME. RECEIVED IT. AND IT'S NOT CONSIDERED. 
I*i ALSO THE HOME THAT MR. ERNEST GLEED IS IN WAS INTENDED TO 
14 BE GIVEN TO HIM. THAT HE HAD THAT HOME AND IT WAS THE 
15 CLEAR, FULL INTENT THAT THAT HOME BE HIS HOME AND NO 
16 QUESTIONS 3WITH THE EVIDENCE. THE ONLY ONE I'M TALKING 
17 ABOUT IS HER HOME AND WHAT HER INTENT WAS. AND I THINK 
18 CLEARLY HER INTENT THROUGHOUT THIS WAS THAT SHE MAINTAIN 
19 A LIFE INTEREST AND IT BE HER HOME DURING HER LIFE. SHE 
20 CONVEYED IT ORIGINALLY TO KRN1K THE INTENT WAS IS THAT 
21 SHE HAVE IT FOR A LIFETIME AND UPON DEATH ERNIE WOULD 
22 HAVE IT. AND WHEN SHE CHANGED ERNIE'S NAME HER INTENT AT 
21 THAT TIME WAS TO — AND I THINK WHEN SHE DID IT SHE 
24 INTEND TO CONVEY IT*"" THAT SHE MAINTAINED A LIFE 
25 INTEREST AND SHE CONVEY IT TO PENNY AFTER HER DEATH. AND 
16 
1. BOTHfP THOSE INSTANCES, BASED dWrHE LAW, I THINK THAT 
2 THAT IS NOT A VALID CONVEYANCE. 
3 MR. PATTERSON: MAY WE BRIEF THAT. MY 
4 CONSIDERATION ON THAT SCORE IS THAT, YOU KNOW, NUMBER 
5 ONE, IS FENNY MACKEY A PERSON WITH STANDING TO ALLEGE 
6 THAT. 
7 THE COURT: THAT'S CORRECT. AND THAT MAY BE. 
8 MR. PATTERSON: NUMBER TWO, IF SHE IS NOT, THEN 
9 IT WOULD CERTAINLY BE A — WE CERTAINLY KNOW THAT THE 
10 HEIRS ARE. AND THERE'S A PENDING PROBATE THAT HAS BEEN 
11 ASSIGNED TO JUDGE PAGE. IT WOULD APPEAR THAT THE 
12 FLNDINGS THAT YOU ARE MAKING WOULD APPLY ON A COLLATERAL 
13 ESTOPPEL -— YOU KNOW, I'M JUST, YOU KNOW, BLATHERING A 
14 LITTLE -- BUT WOULD HAVE A COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL EFFECT ON 
15 MR. Gi.KKI) BECAUSE HE'S HA]) FULL OPPORTUNITY, YOU KNOW, TO 
1.6 WHAT, APPEAR, DEFEND AND CROSS EXAMINE OR WHATEVER. THAT 
17 WOULD THEN MEAN THAT SHOULD THE MERITS OR ANY ONE OF THE 
'18 HEIRS CHOOSE TO CHALLENGE, THAT THAT DETERMINATION THAT 
19 THEY WOULD DO SO TYPICALLY WITHIN A PROBATE PROCEEDING, 
20 WOULD THEY NOT. 
21 THE COURT: AND J THINK THAT PROBABLY IS THE 
22 CASE. BECAUSE 1 DON'T THINK WITH THE OTHER HEIRS THAT 
23 PENNY HAS THE STANDING BECAUSE 1 DON'T THINK SHE INHERITS 
24 THROUGH THE ESTATE?" 
25 MR. PATTERSON: THROUGH HER LIVING MOTHER. NO, 
17 
1 I WOU^h'T THINK SO. MY THOUGHT W s I LOOK AT IT — 
2 THK COURT: WELL, I WOULD GIVE EITHER PARTY, 
3 IF THEY WANTED TO BRIEF THK ISSUE. BUT IT IS PROPERLY — 
4 I THINK IT WOULD BE SOMETHING THAT SHOULD BE HANDLED AT 
5 PROBATE. 
6 MR. PATTERSON: I DON'T KNOW HOW TO SPELL 
7 PROBATE. MY LAW PARTNER DOES. AND I WOULD BRIEF THAT IF 
8 IT IS RELEVANT TO YOUR HONOR. YOU KNOW, I THINK THAT 
9 WOULD BE BECAUSE IF I THINK MY INSTINCTS SAY THIS WOULD 
10 BE A MATTER THAT A PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE WOULD THEN 
11 SAY, BUT THERE ARE ASSETS THAT THIS ESTATE BECAUSE OF 
12 JUDGE MEMMOTT'S RULING WILL NOW CLAIM THAT PREVIOUSLY ON 
13 JOINT TENANCY DEED WE DID NOT UNDER SURVIVORSHIP RULES 
14 OUTSIDE OK PROBATE. THEREFORE, JUDGE MEMMOTT'S RULING IS 
15 PUTTING US BACK INTO THE ESTATE OR HAS THE EFFECT OF 
16 DOING THAT. 
17 THE COURT: I. THINK THAT WOULD PROBABLY BE THE 
18 CASE. THK DEED THEY TRANSFERRED — L MEAN BECAUSE THEY 
19 HAD TRANSFERRED THAT ORIGINAL DEED WAS PROBABLY IT WASN'T 
20 A DEED THAT WAS PROPERLY AT THAT TIME IN ERNIE'S NAME. 
21 WHY DON'T I GIVE — IF YOU --- I WOULD ALLOW — I WOULD 
22 GIVE YOU 'to DAYS. UF THERE'S NOTHING FILED THEN WE'LL 
23 JUST, MR. PATTERSON, ASK YOU TO PREPARE FINDINGS OF FACT 
24 AND CONCLUSIONS OK IfTAW CONSISTENT WITH THIS. ANY OTHER 
25 OUESTIONS OR ISSUES BEKORK THE COURT. THE COURT THEN 
18 
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2 ( CONCLUDED AT 11:40 ) 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
J4 
1.5 
16 
1.7 
18 
19 
20 
21 
* » «_i 
2 3 
24 
25 
19 
REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
SS 
COUNTY OF DAVIS ) 
I, JOANNE PRATT, CSR, DO HEREBY CERTIFY THAT THE 
FOREGOING PROCEEDINGS WERE TAKEN BEFORE ME, A NOTARY PUBLIC 
IN AND FOR THE STATE OF UTAH, AND REGISTERED PROFESSIONAL 
REPORTER, RESIDING IN KAYSVILLE, UTAH, AT THE TIME AND 
PLACE SHOWN HEREIN; 
THAT SAID PROCEEDINGS WERE REPORTED BY ME IN 
STENOTYPE, AND WERE THEREAFTER BY ME CAUSED TO BE REDUCED TO 
TYPEWRITTEN FORM CONSISTING OF PAGES / THROUGH/^ BOTH 
INCLUSIVE. 
THAT THE SAME CONSTITUTES A TRUE AND CORRECT 
TRANSCRIPTION OF SAID PROCEEDINGS. 
I FURTHER CERTIFY THAT I AM NOT OF KIN OR OTHERWISE 
ASSOCIATED WITH ANY OF THE PARTIES HEREIN, OR THEIR COUNSEL, 
AND THAT I AM NOT INTERESTED IN THE EVENT THEREOF. 
WITNESS MY HAND AND OFFICIAL SEAL AT FARMINGTON, UTAH, 
THIS [xS4- DAY OF . ^ S* r^t . /77J5 • 
^TPBTIFIFn ^HDRTHAKin 
'CERTIFIED SHORTHAND REPORTER 
(UTAH CSR NO. 214) 
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lished by the donor but it will usually be 
the case that, as noted in Loch v. Mayer, 50 
Misc. 442, 448, 100 N.Y.S. 837, dealing with 
a disaster relief fund solicited by a church, 
'Tflew donations were accompanied with 
writings of any kind, and no such writing, 
so far as the evidence shows, states with 
any attempt at precision the terms of the 
trust." As to any contribution found to 
have been made for a restricted purpose, it 
will also be of importance whether it has 
been fully expended. 
Relevant also, as already noted, will be 
the activities of the corporation in fact car-
ried out under its charter, and to a lesser 
extent the corporate purposes stated in the 
charter. Specifically, in terms of the 
present case has the emphasis of MSSO as 
shown by its creation and its activities been 
on the disease or on service? Both are 
specifically mentioned in its name and both 
are referred to in the statement of its pur-
poses contained in its amended certificate 
of incorporation. 
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment 
appealed from and the order of the Appel-
late Division brought up for review should 
be reversed, with costs to appellants, and 
the matter remitted to Supreme Court, 
Kings County, for further proceedings in 
accordance with this opinion. 
N.Y. 869 
68 N.Y.2d 48 
Michael S. GRUEN, Respondent, 
v. 
Kemija GRUEN, Appellant. 
Court of Appeals of New York. 
July 8, 1986. 
Son brought action seeking declaration 
that he was righful owner of a painting in 
his stepmother's possession. Son alleged 
that his deceased father made a valid gift 
of the painting to him while reserving a life 
estate. The Supreme Court, Kings County, 
Levine, J., entered judgment in favor of 
stepmother, and son appealed. The Su-
preme Court, Appellate Division, 104 
A.D.2d 171, 488 N.Y.S.2d 401, reversed, 
and stepmother appealed. The Court of 
Appeals, Simons, J., held that* (1) a valid 
inter vivos gift of a chattel may be made 
where donor reserves a life estate in chat-
tel and donee never has physical possession 
of it before donor's death; (2) evidence 
established that father intended to transfer 
ownership of painting to son while retain-
ing a life estate in it; and (3) letters from 
father to son referring to gift were suffi-
cient to satisfy delivery requirement. 
Affirmed. 
WACHTLER, C J., and SIMONS, KAYE, 
ALEXANDER and HANCOCK, JJ., con-
cur. 
TITONE, J., taking no part. 
Judgment appealed from and order of 
the Appellate Division brought up for re-
view reversed, etc. 
( O | KEY NUMBCR SYSTEM^ 
1. Gifts e=>ll, 18(1) 
A valid inter vivos gift of a chattel 
may be made where the donor has reserved 
a life estate in the chattel and donee never 
has physical possession of it before donor's 
death. 
2. Gifts «=>4 
To make a valid inter vivos gift there 
must exist* intent on part of donor to make 
a present transfer; delivery of the gift, 
either actual or constructive to donee; and 
acceptance by donee. 
3. Gifts «=»49(1) 
Proponent of a gift has burden of 
proving elements of a gift by clear and 
convincing evidence. 
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4. Gifts <s=>15 
An inter vivos gift requires that the 
donor intend to make an irrevocable 
present transfer of ownership; if the inten-
tion is to make a testamentary disposition 
effective only after death, the gift is invalid 
unless made by will. 
5. Gifts <s=>49(l) 
Evidence, including letters from father 
to son, supported conclusion that father 
intended to transfer ownership of painting 
to son in 1963 but to retain a life estate in 
it and that he did effectively transfer a 
remainder interest in the painting to his 
son at that time; moreover, that father 
retained possession of the painting, insured 
it, allowed others to exhibit it and made 
necessary repairs to it was not inconsistent 
with his retention of a life estate. 
6. Gifts <£=>4 
In determining whether there has been 
a valid inter vivos gift of a remainder inter-
est following a life estate, test is whether 
donor intended gift to have no effect until 
after his death, or whether he intended to 
transfer some present interest; as long as 
the evidence establishes an intent to make 
a present and irrevocable transfer of title 
or the right of ownership, there is a 
present transfer of some interest and the 
gift is effective immediately. 
7. Gifts <s=>18(2) 
In order to have a valid inter vivos 
gift, there must be a delivery of the gift, 
either by physical delivery of the subject of 
the gift or a constructive or symbolic deliv-
ery such as by an instrument of gift, suffi-
cient to divest the donor of dominion and 
control over the property. 
8. Gifts <s=18(l) 
Delivery requirement of an inter vivos 
gift is not rigid or inflexible, but is to be 
applied in light of its purpose to avoid 
mistakes by donors and fraudulent claims 
by donees, and thus what is sufficient to 
constitute delivery must be tailored to suit 
circumstances of the case. 
9. Gifts <s=>23 
Letters from father to son which un-
ambiguously established that father intend-
ed to make a present gift to son of title to 
painting while father retained a life estate 
were sufficient instruments of gift to satis-
fy delivery requirement; father was not 
required to part with possession of the 
painting when possession is exactly what 
he intended to retain. 
10. Gifts <s=>23 
A donor making a gift of a remainder 
interest in a chattel following a life estate 
is not required, to satisfy delivery require-
ment of a gift, to physically deliver the 
chattel into the donee's hands with donee 
redelivering the chattel to the donor. 
11. Gifts <&=>24, 47(2) 
Acceptance by a donee is essential to 
validity of an inter vivos gift, but when a 
gift is of value to the donee, law will pre-
sume an acceptance. 
12. Gifts <&=>49(3) 
Son presented clear and convincing 
proof of his acceptance of a remainder in-
terest given by his father in painting by 
evidence that he made several contempora-
neous statements acknowledging the gift 
to his friends and associates, even showing 
some of them his father's gift letter, and 
that he had retained both letters for over 
17 years to verify gift after his father died; 
moreover, fact that son failed to list inter-
est in painting as an asset in affidavit filed 
in matrimonial action over ten years after 
acceptance did not overcome substantial 
showing of acceptance. 
Paul G. Whitby and Helen J. Williamson, 
New York City, for appellant 
Michael S. Gruen, pro se. 
Victor P. Muskin, New York City, for 
Michael S. Gruen, respondent 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
SIMONS, Judge. 
Plaintiff commenced this action seeking 
a declaration that he is the rightful owner 
GRUEN v. GRUEN 
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0f a painting which he alleges his father, instructions 
n0w deceased, gave to him. He concedes 
that he has never had possession of the 
but asserts that his father made a 
N.Y. 871 
painting 
valid gift of the title in 1963 reserving a 
life estate for himself. His father retained 
possession of the painting until he died in 
1980. Defendant, plaintiffs stepmother, 
has the painting now and has refused plain-
tiffs requests that she turn it over to him. 
She contends that the purported gift was 
testamentary in nature and invalid insofar 
as the formalities of a will were not met or, 
alternatively, that a donor may not make a 
valid inter vivos gift of a chattel and retain 
a life estate with a complete right of pos-
session. Following a seven-day nonjury tri-
al, Special Term found that plaintiff had 
failed to establish any of the elements of 
an inter vivos gift and that in any event an 
attempt by a donor to retain a present 
possessory life estate in a chattel invalidat-
ed a purported gift of it. The Appellate 
Division held that a valid gift may be made 
reserving a life estate and, finding the ele-
ments of a gift established in this case, it 
reversed and remitted the matter for a 
determination of value (104 A.D.2d 171, 488 
N.Y.S.2d 401). That determination has 
now been made and defendant appeals di-
rectly to this court, pursuant to CPLR 
5601(d), from the subsequent final judg-
ment entered in Supreme Court awarding 
plaintiff $2,500,000 in damages represent-
ing the value of the painting, plus interest. 
We now affirm. 
The subject of the dispute is a work 
entitled "Schloss Kammer am Attersee II" 
painted by a noted Austrian modernist, 
Gustav Klimt. It was purchased by plain-
tiffs father, Victor Gruen, in 1959 for 
*8>000. On April 1,1963 the elder Gruen, a 
successful architect with offices and resi-
dences in both New York City and Los 
Angeles during most of the time involved 
*n this action, wrote a letter to plaintiff, 
th
*n an undergraduate student at Harvard, 
stating that he was giving him the Klimt 
Panting for his birthday but that he 
Joshed to retain the possession of it for his 
lfetime. This letter is not in evidence, 
Pparently because plaintiff destroyed it on 
from his father. Two other 
letters were received, however, one dated 
May 22, 1963 and the other April 1, 1963. 
Both had been dictated by Victor Gruen 
and sent together to plaintiff on or about 
May 22, 1963. The letter dated May 22, 
1963 reads as follows: 
"Dear Michael: 
"I wrote you at the time of your birthday 
about the gift of the painting by Klimt. 
"Now my lawyer tells me that because of 
the existing tax laws, it was wrong to 
mention in that letter that I want to use 
the painting as long as I live. Though I 
still want to use it, this should not appear 
in the letter. I am enclosing, therefore, 
a new letter and I ask you to send the old 
one back to me so that it can be de-
stroyed. 
"I know this is all very silly, but the 
lawyer and our accountant insist that 
they must have in their possession copies 
of a letter which will serve the purpose 
of making it possible for you, once I die, 
to get this picture without having to pay 
inheritance taxes on it. 
"Love, 
"s/Victor". 
Enclosed with this letter was a substitute 
gift letter, dated April 1, 1963, which stat-
ed: 
"Dear Michael: 
"The 21st birthday, being an important 
event in life, should be celebrated accord-
ingly. I therefore wish to give you as a 
present the oil painting by Gustav Klimt 
of Schloss Kammer which now hangs in 
the New York living room. You know 
that Lazette and I bought it some 5 or 6 
years ago, and you always told us how 
much you liked it. 
"Happy birthday again. 
"Love, 
"s/Victor". 
Plaintiff never took possession of the paint-
ing nor did he seek to do so. Except for a 
brief period between 1964 and 1965 when it 
was on loan to art exhibits and when resto-
ration work was performed on it, the paint-
ing remained in his father's possession, 
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moving with him from New York City to 
Beverly Hills and finally to Vienna, Aus-
tria, where Victor Gruen died on February 
14, 1980. Following Victor's death plaintiff 
requested possession of the Klimt painting 
and when defendant refused, he com-
menced this action. 
[1-3] The issues framed for appeal are 
whether a valid inter vivos gift of a chattel 
may be made where the donor has reserved 
a life estate in the chattel and the donee 
never has had physical possession of it 
before the donor's death and, if it may, 
which factual findings on the elements of a 
valid inter vivos gift more nearly comport 
with the weight of the evidence in this 
case, those of Special Term or those of the 
Appellate Division. The latter issue re-
quires application of two general rules. 
First, to make a valid inter vivos gift there 
must exist the intent on the part of the 
donor to make a present transfer; delivery 
of the gift, either actual or constructive to 
the donee; and acceptance by the donee 
(Matter of Szabo, 10 N.Y.2d 94, 98, 217 
N.Y.S.2d 593, 176 N.E.2d 395; Matter of 
Kelly, 285 N.Y. 139, 150, 33 N.E.2d 62 
[dissenting in part opn]; Matter of Van 
Alstyne, 207 N.Y. 298, 306, 100 N.E. 802; 
Beaver v. Beaver, 117 N.Y. 421, 428, 22 
N.E. 940). Second, the proponent of a gift 
has the burden of proving each of these 
elements by clear and convincing evidence 
(Matter of Kelley, supra, 285 N.Y. at p. 
150, 33 N.E.2d 62; Matter of Abramottritz, 
38 A.D.2d 387, 389-390, 329 N.Y.S.2d 932, 
affd on opn. 32 N.Y.2d 654, 342 N.Y.S.2d 
855, 295 N.E.2d 654). 
Donative Intent 
[4] There is an important distinction be-
tween the intent with which an inter vivos 
gift is made and the intent to make a gift 
by will. An inter vivos gift requires that 
the donor intend to make an irrevocable 
present transfer of ownership; if the inten-
tion is to make a testamentary disposition 
effective only after death, the gift is invalid 
unless made by will (see, McCarthy v. Pier-
et, 281 N.Y. 407, 409, 24 N.E.2d 102; Gan-
non v. McGuire, 160 N.Y. 476, 481, 55 N.E 
7; Martin v. Funk, 75 N.Y. 134, 137-i3g) 
[5] Defendant contends that the trial 
court was correct in finding that Victor did 
not intend to transfer any present interest 
in the painting to plaintiff in 1963 but only 
expressed an intention that plaintiff was to 
get the painting upon his death. The evi-
dence is all but conclusive, however, that 
Victor intended to transfer ownership of 
the painting to plaintiff in 1963 but to 
retain a life estate in it and that he did, 
therefore, effectively transfer a remainder 
interest in the painting to plaintiff at that 
time. Although the original letter was not 
in evidence, testimony of its contents was 
received along with the substitute gift let-
ter and its covering letter dated May 22, 
1963. The three letters should be con-
sidered together as a single instrument 
(see, Matter of Brandreth, 169 N.Y. 437, 
440, 62 N.E. 563) and when they are they 
unambiguously establish that Victor Gruen 
intended to make a present gift of title to 
the painting at that time. But there was 
other evidence for after 1963 Victor made 
several statements orally and in writing 
indicating that he had previously given 
plaintiff the painting and that plaintiff 
owned it. Victor Gruen retained posses-
sion of the property, insured it, allowed 
others to exhibit it and made necessary 
repairs to it but those acts are not incon-
sistent with his retention of a life estate. 
Furthermore, whatever probative value 
could be attached to his statement that he 
had bequeathed the painting to his heirs, 
made 16 years later when he prepared an 
export license application so that he coul 
take the painting out of Austria, is negated 
by the overwhelming evidence that he in-
tended a present transfer of title in 19«-
Victor's failure to file a gift tax return on 
the transaction was partially explained t>> 
allegedly erroneous legal advice he i£ 
ceived, and while that omission sometirn 
may indicate that the donor had no m ^ 
tion of making a present gift, it does^ ^ 
necessarily do so and it is not dispositiv 
this case. 
pefendant contends that 
present gift was intended, Victor's reserva-
tion of a lifetime interest in the painting 
defeated it. She relies on a statement from 
Young v. Young, 80 N.Y. 422 that " '[a]ny 
gift of chattels which expressly reserves 
the use of the property to the donor for a 
certain period, or * * * as long as the 
donor shall live, is ineffectual*" (id., at p. 
436, quoting 2 Schouler, Personal Property, 
at 118). The statement was dictum, how-
ever, and the holding of the court was 
limited to a determination that an attempt-
ed gift of bonds in which the donor re-
served the interest for life failed because 
there had been no delivery of the gift, 
either actual or constructive {see, id., at p. 
434; see also, Speelman v. Pascal, 10 
N.Y.2d 313, 319-320, 222 N.Y.S.2d 324, 178 
N.E.2d 723). The court expressly left 
undecided the question "whether a remain-
der in a chattel may be created and given 
by a donor by carving out a life estate for 
himself and transferring the remainder" 
(Young v. Young, supra, at p. 440). We 
answered part of that question in Matter of 
Brandreth, 169 N.Y. 437, 441-442, 62 N.E. 
563, supra) when we held that "[in] this 
state a life estate and remainder can be 
created in a chattel or a fund the same as 
in real property". The case did not require 
us to decide whether there could be a valid 
gift of the remainder. 
[6] Defendant recognizes that a valid 
inter vivos gift of a remainder interest can 
be made not only of real property but also 
of such intangibles as stocks and bonds. 
Indeed, several of the cases she cites so 
hold. That being so, it is difficult to per-
ceive any legal basis for the distinction she 
^ges which would permit gifts of remain-
der interests in those properties but not of 
remainder interests in chattels such as the 
Klimt painting here. The only reason sug-
gested is that the gift of a chattel must 
delude a present right to possession. The 
application of Brandreth to permit a gift 
°f the remainder in this case, however, is 
insistent with the distinction, well recog-
ni2ed in the law of gifts as well as in real 
Property law, between ownership and pos-
session or enjoyment (see, Speelman v. 
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even if a Pascal, 10 N.Y.2d 313, 318, 222 N.Y.S.2d 
324, 178 N.E.2d 723, supra; McCarthy v. 
Pieret, 281 N.Y. 407, 409-411, 24 N.E.2d 
102, supra; Matter of Brandreth, 169 
N.Y. 437, 442, 62 N.E. 563, supra). Inso-
far as some of our cases purport to require 
that the donor intend to transfer both title 
and possession immediately to have a valid 
inter vivos gift (see, Gannon v. McGuire, 
160 N.Y. 476, 481, 55 N.E. 7, supra; 
Young v. Young, 80 N.Y. 422, 430, supra), 
they state the rule too broadly and confuse 
the effectiveness of a gift with the transfer 
of the possession of the subject of that gift. 
The correct test is "'whether the maker 
intended the [gift] to have no effect until 
after the maker's death, or whether he 
intended it to transfer some present inter-
est'" (McCarthy v. Pieret, 281 N.Y. 407, 
409, 24 N.E.2d 102, supra [emphasis add-
ed]; see also, 25 N.YJur., Gifts, § 14, at 
156-157). As long as the evidence estab-
lishes an intent to make a present and 
irrevocable transfer of title or the right of 
ownership, there is a present transfer of 
some interest and the gift is effective im-
mediately (see, Matter of Brady, 228 App. 
Div. 56, 60, 239 N.Y.S. 5, affd. no opn. 254 
N.Y. 590, 173 N.E. 879; In re Sussman's 
Estate, 125 N.Y.S.2d 584, 589-591, affd no 
opn. 283 App.Div. 1051, 134 N.Y.S.2d 586, 
Matter of Valentine, 122 Misc. 486, 489, 
204 N.Y.S. 284; Brown, Personal Property 
§ 48, at 133-136 [2d ed]; 25 N.YJur., 
Gifts, § 30, at 173-174; see also, Farmers' 
Loan & Trust Co. v. Winthrop, 238 N.Y. 
477, 485-486, 144 N.E. 686). Thus, in 
Speelman v. Pascal (supra), we held valid 
a gift of a percentage of the future royal-
ties to the play "My Fair Lady" before the 
play even existed. There, as in this case, 
the donee received title or the right of 
ownership to some property immediately 
upon the making of the gift but possession 
or enjoyment of the subject of the gift was 
postponed to some future time. 
Defendant suggests that allowing a do-
nor to make a present gift of a remainder 
with the reservation of a life estate will 
lead courts to effectuate otherwise invalid 
testamentary dispositions of property. The 
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two have entirely different characteristics, 
however, which make them distinguishable. 
Once the gift is made it is irrevocable and 
the donor is limited to the rights of a life 
tenant not an owner. Moreover, with the 
gift of a remainder title vests immediately 
in the donee and any possession is post-
poned until the donor's death whereas un-
der a will neither title nor possession vests 
immediately. Finally, the postponement of 
enjoyment of the gift is produced by the 
express terms of the gift not by the nature 
of the instrument as it is with a will (see, 
Robb v. Washington & Jefferson Coll, 185 
N.Y. 485, 493, 78 N.E. 359). 
Delivery 
[7,8] In order to have a valid inter vi-
vos gift, there must be a delivery of the 
gift, either by a physical delivery of the 
subject of the gift or a constructive or 
symbolic delivery such as by an instrument 
of gift, sufficient to divest the donor of 
dominion and control over the property 
(see, Matter ofSzabo, 10 N.Y.2d 94, 98-99, 
217 N.Y.S.2d 593, 176 N.E.2d 395, supra; 
Speelman v. Pascal, 10 N.Y.2d 313, 318-
320, 222 N.Y.S.2d 324, supra; Beaver v. 
Beaver, 117 N.Y. 421, 428-429, 22 N.E. 
940, supra; Matter of Cohn, 187 App.Div. 
392, 395, 176 N.Y.S.2d 225). As the state-
ment of the rule suggests, the requirement 
of delivery is not rigid or inflexible, but is 
to be applied in light of its purpose to avoid 
mistakes by donors and fraudulent claims 
by donees (see, Matter of Van Alstyne, 207 
N.Y. 298, 308,100 N.E. 802, supra; Matter 
of Cohn, supra, 187 App.Div. at pp. 395-
396, 176 N.Y.S.2d 255; Mechem, Require-
ment of Delivery in Gifts of Chattels and 
of Choses in Actions Evidenced by Com-
mercial Instruments, 21 Ill.L.Rev. 341, 
348-349). Accordingly, what is sufficient 
to constitute delivery "must be tailored to 
suit the circumstances of the case" (Matter 
of Szabo, supra, 10 N.Y.2d at p. 98, 217 
N.Y.S.2d 593, 176 N.E.2d 395). The rule 
requires that " *[t]he delivery necessary to 
consummate a gift must be as perfect as 
the nature of the property and the circum-
stances and surroundings of the parties 
will reasonably permit*" (id.; Vincent v. 
Rix, 248 N.Y. 76, 83, 161 N.E. 425; Matter 
of Van Alstyne, supra, 207 N.Y. at p. 309, 
100 N.E. 802: see, Beaver v. Beaver, su-
pra, 117 N.Y. at p. 428, 22 N.E. 940). 
[9] Defendant contends that when a 
tangible piece of personal property such as 
a painting is the subject of a gift, physical 
delivery of the painting itself is the best 
form of delivery and should be required. 
Here, of course, we have only delivery of 
Victor Gruen's letters which serve as in-
struments of gift. Defendant's statement 
of the rule as applied may be generally 
true, but it ignores the fact that what 
Victor Gruen gave plaintiff was not all 
rights to the Klimt painting, but only title 
to it with no right of possession until his 
death. Under these circumstances, it 
would be illogical for the law to require the 
donor to part with possession of the paint-
ing when that is exactly what he intends to 
retain. 
[10] Nor is there any reason to require 
a donor making a gift of a remainder inter-
est in a chattel to physically deliver the 
chattel into the donee's hands only to have 
the donee redeliver it to the donor. As the 
facts of this case demonstrate, such a re 
quirement could impose practical burdens 
on the parties to the gift while serving the 
delivery requirement poorly. Thus, in or-
der to accomplish this type of delivery the 
parties would have been required to travel 
to New York for the symbolic transfer and 
redelivery of the Klimt painting which was 
hanging on the wall of Victor Gruen's Man-
hattan apartment. Defendant suggests 
that such a requirement would be stronger 
evidence of a completed gift, but in the 
absence of witnesses to the event or any 
written confirmation of the gift it would 
provide less protection agamst fraudulent 
claims than have the written instruments 
of gift delivered in this case. 
Acceptance 
[11,12] Acceptance by the donee is es-
sential to the validity of an inter vivos gift 
but when a gift is of value to the donee, as 
it is here, the law will presume an accep * 
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ance on his part (Matter of Kelsey, 26 
N.Y.2d 792, 309 N.Y.S.2d 219, 257 N.E.2d 
663, affg. on opn. at 29 A.D.2d 450, 456, 
289 N.Y.S.2d 314; Beaver v. Beaver, 117 
N.Y. 421, 429, 22 N.E. 940, supra). Plain-
tiff did not rely on this presumption alone 
but also presented clear and convincing 
proof of his acceptance of a remainder in-
terest in the Klimt painting by evidence 
that he had made several contemporaneous 
statements acknowledging the gift to his 
friends and associates, even showing some 
of them his father's gift letter, and that he 
had retained both letters for over 17 years 
to verify the gift after his father died. 
Defendant relied exclusively on affidavits 
filed by plaintiff in a matrimonial action 
with his former wife, in which plaintiff 
failed to list his interest in the painting as 
an asset. These affidavits were made over 
10 years after acceptance was complete 
and they do not even approach the evidence 
in Matter of Kelly (285 N.Y. 139, 148-149, 
33 N.E.2d 62 [dissenting in part opn.], su-
pra) where the donee, immediately upon 
delivery of a diamond ring, rejected it as 
"too flashy". We agree with the Appellate 
Division that interpretation of the affidavit 
was too speculative to support a finding of 
rejection and overcome the substantial 
showing of acceptance by plaintiff. 
Accordingly, the judgment appealed from 
and the order of the Appellate Division 
brought up for review should be affirmed, 
with costs. 
WACHTLER, CJ., and MEYER, KAYE, 
ALEXANDER, TITONE and HANCOCK, 
JJ., concur. 
Judgment appealed from and order of 
the Appellate Division brought up for re-
view affirmed, with costs. 
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68 NY.2d 59 
In the Matter of FIRST ENERGY 
LEASING CORPORATION et 
al., Appellants, 
v. 
ATTORNEY-GENERAL of the State of 
New York, Respondent 
Court of Appeals of New York. 
July 10, 1986. 
Attorney General initiated proceeding 
pursuant to the Martin Act, naming 59 
parties allegedly involved in promoting en-
ergy management systems as a fraudulent 
tax shelter scheme. Defendants moved to 
require Attorney General to conduct their 
examination ordered pursuant to the Act 
entirely before a justice of the Supreme 
Court or referee, and to transcribe the tes-
timony of all witnesses who appeared in 
the proceeding and to immediately file the 
transcripts in the county clerk's office. 
The Supreme Court, New York County, 
McQuillan, J., denied the motion, and de-
fendants appealed. The Supreme Court, 
Appellate Division, 107 A.D.2d 1095, 485 
N.Y.S.2d 159, affirmed, and defendants ap-
pealed by permission. The Court of Ap-
peals, Hancock, J., held that: (1) Attorney 
General was required by express provision 
of statute to examine defendants only be-
fore a justice of the Supreme Court or 
designated referee, and (2) statute did not 
require immediate filing of witness tran-
scripts. 
Affirmed as modified. 
1. Securities Regulation <3=>274 
When the Attorney General conducts 
an investigation pursuant to the Martin Act 
and proceeds specifically under sections 
presupposing an official determination to 
commence an action under the Act, he is by 
express provision of the statute permitted 
to examine witnesses only before a justice 
of the Supreme Court or designated ref-
eree; broad powers accorded Attorney 
General under section of the Act authoriz-
i\A<kxi,v\A W w \ iVk 7 
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^erefore, w u not a 
prerequisite to recovery by the plaintiff up* 
on the defendant's undertaking, Id; 
Higinbotham v, Manchester, 113 Conn. 62, 
72, 154 A. 242, 79 A.L.R. 85. The defend-
ant's undertaking was not to pay a stated 
sum and no more but to pay the amount of 
the note plus interest In such a case the 
damages recoverable against the guarantor 
are the amount due on the obligation. 12 
R.CL 1096, § 51. And this includes in-
terest* Shelton v, French, 33 Conn. 489, 
496; Cooper v. Page, 24 Me. 73, 77, 41 
Ara.Dec. 371; Birken v. Tapper, 45 S.D. 
600, 60S, 189 N.W. 698, 24 AJLR. 832; 
Bank of South Carolina v, Knotta, 10 Rich., 
S.C. 543, 546, 70 Am.Dec 234; New Or-
leans v. Clark, 95 U.S. 644, 651, 24 L,E<L 
521; 24 Am.Jur, 925, § 78. See also 28 
CJ. 966. The court erred in not allowing 
the plaintiff interest to the date of judg-
ment 
There is no error on the defendant's ap* 
peal There is error on the plaintiff's ap-
peal, the judgment is set aside and the Su-
perior Court is directed to enter judgment 
for the plaintiff for $1900 with b u r e t ^ Ti t t ^ T V ' p ^ U U e . 
£rom November 2,1931, to the date of judg-
In this opinion, the other judges concur-
red 
6, Aekeewtedgmeat *»*2 
Deeds *»J»4<4) 
Where deed was actually delivered to 
grantee, the execution of the &ttestaeto* 
clause was prima facie proof that deed waa 
delivered, and there waa a rebuttable pre-
sumption that grantee assented, sines deed 
waa beneficial to him, 
4* Acknowledgment *»52 
Deeds $»l*4(4) 
The presumption of Intention to deliver 
deed, arising from execution of attestation 
clause, and presumption that grantee assent-
ed to delivery, can be overcome only by evi« 
dance that no delivery was in fact intended. 
5. Otsds «*208<t) 
Where grantor deeded property to gran* 
tee and recorded deed and grantee then re-
deeded the same property to tractor by deed 
which was not recorded, statement by gran-
tor that purpose of transaction waa to pro-
tect bins in event grantee predeceased gran* 
tor, conclusively established that there waa 
a legal delivery of the unrecorded deed, 
since the purpose of the transaction would 
have been defeated had there been no de-
» . « * - * n ^ WUUiUUim UUimiJ 'im 
(o\wn*m 5> 
126 Conn. 391 
SWEgNEV v, SWEENEY, 
made by placing the deed is the hands of 
a third person to be kept by him until the 
happening of the event upon the happening 
of which the deed Is to he delirered over by 
the third person to the grantee, and con* 
ditiooa) delivery to a grantee vesta absolute 
title in the grantee. 
See Words sod Phrases, Permanent 
Edition, for all other definltiona of 
•'Conditional D^iry". 
Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut 
March 6, 1940. 
1. Dssds *»206(3) 
The physical powesslon of a duly exe-
cuted deed is not conclusive proof that it 
waa legally delivered, even where there has 
been a manual delivery. 
2. Dssds 4»56(2) 
"Delirery" of rf deed must be made 
with the intent to pass title if It is to be 
effective* 
Set Wordt 
Edition, for 
"Denary". 
-? JWrf* teflL 
and Phrases, Permanent 
all other definitions of 
• wnere gramm w*re<*w V» ~*>" ~« - •* 
tee and recorded de«d and granite then re-
deeded property directly to grantor by deed 
which was not recorded* and grantor pre-
deceased grantee, delivery of the unrecorded 
to the grantor on condition that it was to he 
effective only If the grantee predeceased 
grantor was not Inoperative as a "condi-
tional delivery". 
0, Evidence C»3$0(i), 462 
Parol evidence is not admissible to •ary 
the terms of the deed but may he received 
to show the use that was to be msde of it 
9. Evldtnoe 694(6 
Where grantor deeded property to gr*a« 
tee and recorded deed, aao grantee then re-
SWEENEY r< 
u 
deeded the property to the grantor, by deed 
wnicb was unrecorded, and grantor** widow 
brought suit to cancel the recorded deed 
afUr the grantor's death, permitting town 
clerk to testify to certain statement* made 
by the grantor when the deed was drafted, 
WAS proper as showing the circumstances 
surrounding delivery. 
SWEENEY Conn. 807 
Appeal from Superior Court, Middlesex 
County; Alfred C Baldwin, Judge. 
Action by Maria E Sweeney, adminis-
tratrix of the estate of Maurice Sweeney, 
deceased, against John M. Sweeney to can-
cel a certain deed and for other relief and 
tried to the Court Judgment for the de-
fendant, and the plaintiff appeal*. 
Error and new trial ordered. 
Argued before MALTBIE, C J., and 
HINMAN, AVERY, BROWN, and JEN-
NINGS, JJ. 
William M. Harney, of Hartford, and 
Joseph V. Fay, Jr„ of New Haven, for ap-
pellant 
James M. Kelly and Thomas C Flood, 
both of Middletown, for appellee. 
JENNINGS, Judge. 
Maurice Sweeney, plaintiffs Intestate, 
hereinafter called Maurice, deeded his farm 
to his brother J6hn M. Sweeney, herein-
after called John, and the deed was re-
corded * John deeded the property back to 
MauSce, This deed is unrecorded and was 
accidentally burned The question to be 
decided is whether the *econ7"lieed was 
delivered and if to, whether or not a con-
dition claimed to be attached to the de-
livery is operative. This must be deter* 
mined on the finding'. The following state-
ment includes such changes therein as are 
required by the evidence: 
The plaintiff is the widow and adminis-
tratrix of Maurice but had not lived with 
him for the twenty yean preceding his 
death in September, 1938, at the age of 
seventy-three yean. Maurice lived on a 
tract of land of some hundred and thirty-
five acres which he owned in East Hamp-
ton, where he ran a tavern. John Assisted 
him in running the tavern to some extent 
On February 2, 1937, Maurice and John 
went to the town cleric's office in East 
Hampton pursuant to an appointment made 
the preceding day. Maurice requested the 
town clerk to draw a deed of his East 
Hampton property to John and this was 
done* At the same time he requested that 
a deed be prepared from John to himself 
so that be, Maurice, would be protected if 
John predeceased him. Both deeds were 
duly executed. The first was left for re-
cording and the second was taken awiy by 
Maurice and never recorded. A week or 
two later Maurice took to John the re-
corded deed and a week or two after that 
took the unrecorded deed to John's house. 
John kept both deeds and gave the second 
deed to his attorney after the institution of 
this action. It was destroyed when the 
latter** office was burned. After the execu-
tion of the deeds, Maurice continued to oc-
cupy the property, paid the fixed charges, 
received the rents and exercised full domin-
ion over it until his death. In April, 1937, 
Maurice matfe a written lease to Ernest 
Myers of a portion of the premises and on 
June 18, 1938, a written lease to Frank and 
Esther Fricke for twenty yeaas. The first 
lease is lost but the second was recorded 
The defendant never collected any money 
from tenants or paid any fixed charges or 
repairs prior to the death of Maurice. On 
these facts the atrial court concluded that 
there was no intention to make present de-
livery of John's deed to Maurice, that 
there was no delivery or acceptance there-
of, that it was not intended to operate un-
til John's death and rendered judgment 
for the defendant 
This deed was, in effect, manually, de-
livered. Maurice continued to occupy the 
property and exercised full dominion over 
it without interference by John. It follows 
that all the essentials of a good delivery 
were present unless there is something in 
the contentions of John which defeats this 
result .He claims that there was no inten-
tion on his part to make present delivery. 
[I, 2] It is, of course, true that physical 
possession of a duly executed deed is not 
conclusive proof that it was legally de-
livered McDermott v. McDermott, 97 
Conn. 31, 34, 115 A. 638. This is so under 
some circumstances even where there has 
been a manual delivery. Hotaling v. Hotal-
inf. 193 Cal. 368, 381, 224 P. 455, 56 A.LH 
734, and note page 746. Delivery must be 
made with the intent to pass title if it is 
to be effective. Porter v. Woodbouse, 59 
Conn. 568, 575, 22 A. 299, 13 L.R.A. 64, 21 
Am.StRep. 131; McDermott T. McDer-
mott, supra. 
[>$] The deed having been in effect 
actually delivered to Maurice, the execution 
of the attestation clause was prima fade 
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proof that the deed was delivered. New 229, 234, 204 P. 818 (grantor retained pos-
Haven Trust Co. v, Camp, 81 Conn. 539, session of the premises And gave a morv 
542, 71 A. 788. There is a rebuttable pre 
sumption that the grantee assented since 
the deed was beneficial to him. Moore v. 
Giles, 49 Conn. 370, 373. No fact is found 
which militates against this presumption. 
Where deeds are formally executed and de-
livered, these presumptions can be over-
come only by evidence that no delivery was 
in fact intended Loughran v. Kummer, 
297 Pa. 179, 183, 146 A. 534; Cragin's Es-
tate, 274 Pa. 1, 5, 117 A. 445; Stewart v. 
Silva, 192 Cai. 405, 409, 221 P. 191. The 
only purpose in making the deed expressed 
by either party was the statement by 
Maurice that it was to protect him in case 
John predeceased him. Since this purpose 
would have been defeated had there been 
no delivery with intent to pass title, this 
conclusively establishes the fact that there 
was a legal delivery, 
[6,7] The defendant next claims that 
if there was a delivery, it was on condition 
and that the condition (the death of John 
oefore that of Maurice) was not and can-
not be fulfilled. This claim is not good J j e - y ~ " i ; 7 ^ n d t a ^ o V ' e v t e ^ 
cause the delivery was to the grantee. "A " - - ? - - — 
conditional delivery is and can only be 
gage of it); Stewart v. Silva, supra, 192 
Cai. 410, 221 P. 191; City National Bank 
v. Anderson, 189 Ky. 487, 225 S.W. 361 
(deed surrendered to grantor); 16 AmJur. 
506; 21 C.J. 874. As is pointed out in the 
Loughran case, supra, this is one of the in-
stances where a positive rule of law may 
defeat the actual intention of the parties. 
The safety of real estate titles is consid-
ered moTt important than the unfortunate 
results which may follow the application 
of the rule in a few individual instances. 
To relax it would open the door wide to 
fraud and the fabrication of evidence. Al-
though the doctrine has been criticised (2 
Tiffany, Real Property [2d Ed.) p. 1764; 5 
Wigmore, . Evidence [2d Ed.] §§ 2405, 
2408) no material change has been noted in 
the attitude of the courts in this country. 
[8,9] The finding- does not support the 
conclusion. The finding shows a delivery 
and, even if a conditional delivery is as-
sumed, the condition is not good for the 
reasons stated. Since a new trial is nccw-
made by placing the deed in the hands of a 
third person to be kept by him until the 
happening of the event upon the happening 
of which the deed is to be delivered over 
by the third person to the grantee.1' Porter 
v. Woodhousc, supra, 59 Conn. 574, 22 A. 
300, 13 L.R.A. 64,21 Am.St.Rep. 131; Ray-
mond v. Smith, 5 Conn. 555, 559. Condi-
tional delivery to a .grantee vests absolute 
title in the latter. Loughran v. Kummer, 
supra, 297 Pa, 185, 146 A- 534; McCarthy 
v. Security i rust ot savings BankTTW cai. 
ground of appeal is noticed. The town 
clerk was permitted to testify to certain 
statements made by Maurice when the deed 
was drafted. Parol evidence is not admis-
sible to vary the terms of the deed but may 
be received to show the use that was to be 
made of it Fisk^ s Appeal, 81 Conn. 433, 
437, 71 A. 559. The ruling was correct as 
showing the circumstances surrounding de-
livery. 
There is error and a new trial is ordered 
In this opinion the other judges con-
curred. 
